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PROLOGUE

Probably the most incredible, exhausting and marvelous thing
that ever happened to me was bearing young. I wanted children. I
*
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Leona Green, Paula Johnson, Suzanne Reynolds and Joan Steinman for their critique
and support; Pat Costello, Bob Drum and Shawn Miller for their research assistance;
and Professor/Lawyer Sarah Weddington, whose argument for the Plaintiff in Roe
v. Wade began the modern colloquy on female and fetal rights.
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was happy, married, and working at a job that paid better than about
ninety percent of all the jobs held by women in the country. But
pregnancy was also one of the worst times in my life. I was sick every
minute, from conception until birth. I was tired, I was worried all
too much about the fetus growing inside me, and I wondered the
whole time if I would be able to really be a mother when the fetus
left my body and my care was no longer autonomic. I practiced yoga
and learned to talk to my fetus as a way of easing my pain, anxiety,
and sickness. Every physical condition I had before the pregnancy
was worsened by the presence of that fetus in my womb. Despite the
costs, I exercised my personal constitutional right to continue my
pregnancy to term.
I read everything I could about pregnancy. One of the most
remarkable things I found out was that if I failed to properly nourish
myself, and even if I died, my fetus would draw nourishment from
the marrow in my bones. My fetus was part of me. I was, except for
my socio-economic class, a typical mother. I was not arrested, committed, or harassed. My wealth, my race, and my access to private
medical care made me inconspicuous - and safe.
There was a time, however, in my middle class, empowered life,
when I had big troubles - when somebody in my family was dying
...slowly, noisily, and with long bouts of madness and chaos. This
deviance from the rest of "normal" society made me vulnerable.
With the best of intentions, the helping professions were there - to
imprison me and my family. They, the doctors, the social workers,
the lawyers, the bill collectors (or the "account representatives"), the
therapists, even the police, identified me and my family as in need of
their attention. They made me sign papers and attend meetings and
go to court and seek counseling and have my children probed and
examined. It did not feel like help to me. And it did not make my
life better, in part because there were no resources available to help
me, or to cure the person who was dying. Even though the helpers
could not help me, I had no way to get them out of my life. I resented
their intrusion, and felt, at a time when my whole world was falling
apart, that I had no privacy, no autonomy, no control.
I thought often about how much worse it would be if I had been
poor, having to juggle the helpers with the prosecutors and the welfare
department, dealing with the lines at public health and the rest of life
in this country that accompanies being poor. My problems would
multiply if I were a woman of color, or from a foreign land with a
language or dialect nobody could understand
- and hooked on drugs.
Two of my childhood friends are doctors. Would they call the
state if I abused my fetus? If I delivered too much valium through
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my umbilical cord? Would they turn me in when I delivered a baby
with serious fetal alcohol syndrome? Would they call the police if my
husband were a drunk, who beat me and threatened my children, or
my fetus? I think not.
One of my friends is a pediatrician. She has testified in abuse
hearings where the primary physician has refused to turn in a lifelong
patient.' I asked her about whether doctors comply with reporting
statutes. She said maybe, sometimes, perhaps. And the doctors she
knows would probably never report their friends, or peers, or nearby
neighbors, or patients whose families they've treated for years, or
their wives' friends, or their husbands' students, or their sisters'
clients. Which leaves those people who have no close relationships
with doctors- the needy.
My other friend is a gynecologist. She resents being "drafted into
the FBI." She doesn't relish the idea of losing touch with a patient
because the Woman can't even trust her own doctor. She once tested
the blood of one of her patients that she suspected of using cocaine.
Armed with positive test results, she called her patient, advised her
of her "rights" and her responsibilities. And never saw her again.
That is, until after her baby died from complications unrelated to
cocaine, which could have been avoided by decent prenatal care. My
doctor told me, a lawyer, that she had learned her lesson.
My own children were delivered by nurse-midwives, whose patients were about evenly divided between older, professional, "hipper"
mothers and women on public aid, for whose care the state had
contracted. The midwives gave each pregnant mother a questionnaire
about, inter alia, street drug use. They begged us to be honest, and
joked about how they would never reveal our answers to the press
when we ran for public office. They certainly did not anticipate the
answers being used against mothers in criminal prosecutions. Some
of them - not among my half - probably were.
INTRODUCTION

At the same time former President Ronald Reagan was running
for office, emphasizing a return to traditional family values, we started
to keep track of the numbers of children born addicted to crack
cocaine. By the end of his presidency, estimates were that nearly
1. See Nancy Kathleen Sugg & Thomas Inui, Primary Care Physicians'
Response to Domestic Violence: Opening Pandora'sBox, 267 JAMA 3157, 3158
(1992) (noting that doctors coming from white, middle-class backgrounds were
unlikely to ask their patients if their injuries were due to domestic violence, unless
the patients were of a lower socio-economic status).
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eleven percent of all women in America used drugs during their
pregnancies. The result of this drug use is that 375,000 newborns were
2
adversely affected by in utero drug exposure.
During the recent presidential campaign, the candidates seemed
even more motivated than their predecessor to emphasize "family"
values.' More than a decade of coercive acts taken by the government,
ostensibly for the protection of the unborn, have done little to improve
the lives of families with drug problems or to deter the use of drugs
by pregnant women.
In a well-intentioned, desperate, yet flawed effort, states have
begun to intervene into the lives of pregnant women. Through criminal
prosecution, civil reporting statutes and agency initiated child abuse
and neglect proceedings, the state has subjected women to court order
and supervision. 4 These governmental approaches to the problem of
addicted pregnancy result in the arrest of some poor woman whose
labor has just ended, and whose child, though short for this world,
will live just long enough to give the state grounds to prosecute its
mother. Dedicated and caring doctors must face the choice of turning
in their patients or violating a reporting law. While well-meaning
social workers must testify that drug abuse is child abuse, and rend a
family, even when no good alternative to that family exists.'
This article examines how controls on addictive pregnancy present
a new and dangerous threat to the treatment of women under the
law. Although there are separate legal and social concerns with each
of these governmental approaches to the serious problem of prenatal
drug and alcohol abuse, in this article I collapse all three into what I
2. Tamar Lewin, Drug Use in Pregnancy: New Issues for the Courts, N.Y.

TIMES, Feb. 5, 1990, at A14.

3. See Eleanor Clift, The Murphy Brown Policy, NEWSWEEK, June 1, 1992,
at 46 ("Bush said the word 'family' nineteen times in a recent speech. .. ").
4. Betsy Burkhard, Judge Puts 'Coke Mom' Under Armed Guard, ROCKFORD
REo. STAR, Apr. 10, 1991, at IA.
5. See ROSEmAR E TONG, WOMEN, SEX AND THE LAW 39, 53 (1984). This paper
is not about why these women use drugs, and it is not about why women with

problems that range from drug addiction to abject poverty have children, although
the latter inquiry is relevant to why they lack a criminal mens rea to harm their
fetuses, and why we cannot simply assume without proof that they are negligent or
unfit parents. Sociologists may be able to shed light on some of the reasons:
Bluntly stated, prostitutes [and women who do not or cannot demand
regular commercial payment for sex] are not born. They are made by a
society that teaches girls that, if all else fails, a woman can always gain
attention or money by offering her body to men who both want and need
it.

Id. at 53.
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call coercive actions. 6 I do so, because in each case, there has been
an adjudication of the woman's "guilt" - as a negligent or unfit
parent, as a criminal who is additionally guilty of being pregnant at
the time, or as a criminal because of her pregnancy, capable of withinbody delivery of a drug to a minor. In each case, for all intents and
purposes, the woman is visited with the same sanction - denial of
the custody of the to-be-born child.
Part I of this article examines the relationship between mother
and fetus. I conclude that no coherent status attaches to the unborn
vis-a-vis its own mother which could justify depriving her of her
privacy, autonomy, and right to make personal family decisions. In
Part II, I present some historical information on the disparate legal
treatment of women throughout history. Part II(A) focuses on those
legal acts undertaken to force women to comply with the feminine
roles. I conclude that coercive acts comport with these anachronistic
and unfair views of what women ought to do and be. Part II(B)
continues the discussion of the disparate treatment based upon gender,
but focuses on the unjustifiable disequilibrium between men and
6. The following list compiles criminal and civil coercive actions brought

against pregnant women. Because it is not always apparent on the face of a decision
whether a woman is being subjected to a coercive action, the following is not an
exhaustive list.
For criminal coercive actions against women see: People v. Moten, 280 Cal.
Rptr. 602 (Ct. App. 1991); In re Valerie D., 595 A.2d 922 (Conn. App. Ct.), cert.
granted, 600 A.2d 1029 (Conn. 1991), rev'd, 613 A.2d 748 (Conn. 1992); State v.
Gethers, 585 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Johnson v. State, 578 So. 2d
419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Blackwell v. DeMaio, 503 So. 2d 1384 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1987); State v. Reyes, 826 P.2d 919 (Idaho Ct. App. 1992); People v. Hardy,
469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); People v. Morabito, 1992 WL 26506 (N.Y.
City Ct. Jan. 29, 1992); State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1992); In re Ruiz, 500
N.E.2d 935 (Ohio Common Pleas 1986). A recent news report noted that criminal
actions against pregnant women are increasing steadily, 160 such arrests have been
made. Conviction for Giving Drugs to Newborn Babies Upset, CI. TRIB., July 24,
1992, Sec. 1, at 2.
For civil coercive actions against women see: Monique T. v. Kathy T., 4 Cal.
Rptr.2d 198 (Ct. App. 1992); In re Stephen W., 271 Cal. Rptr. 319 (Ct. App. 1990);
Troy D. v. Kelly D., 263 Cal. Rptr. 869 (Ct. App. 1989); In re Jesus L., 1990 WL
279626 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 24, 1990); In re Valerie M., 1990 WL 269197 (Conn.
Super. Ct. July 24, 1990); In re J.R., 410 S.E.2d 458 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991); In re
Baby X, 293 N.W.2d 736 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); Alfredo S. v. Nassau County, 568
N.Y.S.2d 123 (App. Div. 1991); In re Stefanel Tyesha C., 556 N.Y.S.2d 280 (App.
Div. 1990); In re Fathima Ashanti K.J., 558 N.Y.S.2d 447 (Fam. Ct. 1990); In re
Milland, 548 N.Y.S.2d 995 (Fam. Ct. 1989); In re Fletcher, 533 N.Y.S.2d 241 (Fam.
Ct. 1988); In re Smith, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Fam. Ct. 1985); Cox v. Court of Common
Pleas, 537 N.E.2d 721 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988).
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women with regard to the responsibilities of children. In particular, I
state that a pro-child stance is inappropriate in the case of pregnant
addicts because it is unfair to distinguish between mothers and fathers.
Part III addresses the discriminatory effect of state intervention into
cases of addicted pregnancy on poor people and people of color.
Lastly, Part V analyzes the constitutionality of coercive government
actions to control addicted pregnant women. This section determines
that the constitutionality of coercive acts against pregnant drug users
does not fit neatly into any one area of analysis. Consequently, I
treat each potentially conflicting constitutional provision separately.
Taken together, the arguments that these coercive acts violate the
constitution are compelling.
I. THE CHAOTIC LEGAL STATUS OF THE UNBORN
The legal status of an unborn under established jurisprudence
does not justify coercive actions on behalf of fetuses. In no other
case, except the abortion of a viable fetus, has the state taken an
unequivocal position in favor of the unborn. There is no consistent
legal conception of when or under what circumstances a fetus becomes
a person.' In addition, there is additional lack of consensus on what
is best for the parties involved and there is no bright-line test for
whose interests should predominate. What women choose to do to
their bodies, however, has become one of the most litigated and
legislated issues in this country.8
7. See, e.g., Albert R. Jonsen, Transitionfrom Fetus to Infant: A Problem
for Law and Ethics, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 697 (1986). This is a thought-provoking
introduction to a symposium issue: "Procreational Autonomy." Although Jonsen
makes many excellent points, I am disturbed by his conclusion that the debate about
what rights a fetus has should be a debate between lawyers and ethicists. Mothers
are strangely missing as a necessary voice in the colloquy.
8. See FAY ROZOVSKY, CONSENT TO TREATMENT (2d ed. 1990). The author

notes about abortion: "It is fair to say that no other medical procedure has been
singled out for such attention." Id. § 3.5, at 159. On the contrary, what other people
do to women's bodies is often ignored. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (1962)
(recommending against the crime of marital rape except in cases of serious aggravation, because of the "generalized consent" to intercourse implied by marriage); cf.
James T.R. Jones, Battered Spouses' Section 1983 Damage Actions Against the
Unresponsive Police After DeShaney, 93 W. VA. L. REV. 251 (1991) (discussing
police failure to adequately respond to domestic abuse and rape calls in the context
of § 1983 litigation); Robin West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REV. 45 (1990); Matthew Litsky, Note,
Explaining the Legal System's InadequateResponse to the Abuse of Women: A Lack
of Coordination, 8 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HuM. RTS. 149 (1990) (calling on the legislature,
courts and police to provide a clear policy of protecting battered women); Symposium
on Domestic Violence, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1992).
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The Supreme Court stated in Roe v. Wade9 that "the unborn
have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense."l 0
The ultimate question surrounding legal actions against pregnant
women who use illegal drugs - ostensibly for the benefit of the
fetuses these women carry - is how do we decide what or who to
restrict? We are neither compelled to coercive actions by their indisputable moral correctness, nor are such actions a logical outgrowth
of our Constitution or common laws. Fetuses are not so clearly
deserving of protection, and if we choose to protect them, we do so
as a consequence of having made a social decision that their rights
are superior to their mothers." There is no coherent body of law to
support that conclusion.
Courts often, but not universally, recognize an interest, regardless
of fetal age, against a third-party tortfeasor 2 or criminal. 3 The

9. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
10. Id. at 162.
11. In making her point that such a decision is a social, not a biological
determination, Dawn Johnsen quotes Arthur Leff:
[T]he relevant legal question ought not to be whether a fetus is 'alive' or 'a
person' from the moment of conception, or the moment of viability, etc.,
as if the question were one of natural rather than social decision. A legal
decision will still have to be made to whom the law ought to give protection,
and at what cost, paid by who[m] ....

Dawn E. Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitu-

tional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599 n.1 (1986).
No one argues that anyone has a right to use and abuse illegal drugs, but the state
of addiction is a medical, not a legal problem, and coercive actions against women
for any reason violate their rights to bodily integrity.
12. Most states still maintain that the fetus' rights in tort are perfected only
when it is born alive. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946) (the pioneer
case, based on injury in the course of delivery, which was considered prenatal);
Wilson v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 190 Cal. Rp'tr. 649, 653 (Ct. App. 1983) (court
discusses the creation of the tort theories in dicta); Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency
Hosp. Ass'n., 349 A.2d 245 (Md. 1975) (injury in course of delivery; potential right
of action assumed without discussion); LaBlue v. Specker, 100 N.W.2d 445 (Mich.
1960) (right of action under dram shop act for death of father occurring when
plaintiff was en ventre sa mere). See generally David Kader, The Law of Tortious
PrenatalDeath Since Roe v. Wade, 45 Mo. L. REV. 639 (1980); Jenifer L. Wilhelm,
Note, Tort Law: Protection of PrenatalLife Through Wrongful Death Statutes, 15
U. DAYTON L. REV. 157 (1989).
13. See State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318 (Minn. 1990); see also People v.
Ford, 581 N.E.2d 1189 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (denying the defendant's claim that the
feticide statute was unconstitutional as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause;
the Ford defendant argued that the statute convicting him of feticide, for stomping
the stomach of his pregnant seventeen-year-old stepdaughter, was unconstitutional
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interest of the fetus vis-a-vis one or both of its progenitors is less
clearly recognized.' 4 Under Roe, non-viable fetuses have no rights
superior to the women who carry them. Somewhere in the middle of
a pregnancy, the Supreme Court has recognized the state's interest in
the preservation of potential human life. But there is a radical
difference between extinguishing that life, which is prohibited by Roe
after viability, and improving the fetal environment to obviate potential dangers upon birth.
For example, in the typical coercive action against pregnant
women, the state takes action at the time of delivery. The state may
allege either a criminal "delivery" of an illegal drug to a person/
infant' 5 or the state may attempt to take custody of a newborn alleging
the mother's civil or criminal neglect.' 6 In the most capricious of
cases, the state has exercised jurisdiction over the mother for reasons
unrelated to her pregnancy - for example, her commission of a
since it allowed a woman to abort the nonviable fetus in the first trimester without
fear of prosecution); State v. Bauer, 471 N.W.2d 363 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)
(affirming trial court's decision holding the defendant guilty in part for felony fetal
homicide and for aiding the fetus' mother in suicide). Contra Keeler v. Superior
Court, 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970) (court cannot create a feticide statute out of a
statute prohibiting the killing of a human being, even though defendant intentionally
thrust his knee into the stomach of his 34-week-pregnant estranged wife); People v.
Vercelletto, 514 N.Y.S.2d 177 (Ulster County Ct. 1987) (defendant could not be
guilty of manslaughter when a fetus was injured during an automobile accident in
which the defendant was driving intoxicated; the court's holding was premised on
the common law notion that a fetus was not a person for purpose of the homicide
statute).
14. There is an excellent summary of the law in Stallman v. Youngquist, 531
N.E.2d 355 (Ill. 1988), in which the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the claim of a
fetus against its mother.
15. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 578 So. 2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(affirming a trial court's decision that the defendant was guilty of delivering cocaine
to her newborn infants by way of her umbilical cord immediately upon their birth,
by using cocaine while in labor), quashed and remanded, Johnson v. State, 602 So.
2d 1288 (Fla. 1992).
16. See, e.g., In re Kristopher M., 1992 WL 26783 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 10,
1992) (affirming a trial court which terminated a mother's parental rights for neglect
after she tested positive for cocaine and the child had seizure upon birth). The mother
had a history of drug and alcohol abuse, along with physical abuse she suffered as
a child. "The fact that the cocaine was introduced into the child's veins a matter of
hours before, rather than after birth does not preclude a finding of neglect." Id. at
*20; In re Stefanel Tyesha C., 556 N.Y.S.2d 280 (App. Div. 1990) (finding of neglect
against three mothers who tested positive for cocaine upon the birth of their three
children); Department of Social Servs. v. Felicia B., 543 N.Y.S.2d 637 (Fam. Ct.
1989) (holding that a finding of neglect against a mother for ingesting cocaine during
pregnancy required the child to test positive for toxicology test upon birth).
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crime. The state coerces her not because of the crime but because of
her pregnant condition. 7 If a pregnant drug addict manages to avoid
the legal system during her pregnancy, the state will not act. Of
course, for many obvious reasons, racial minorities and the impoverished are less likely to be able to avoid contact with the state than
their financially secure, majoritarian counterparts.
No state has attempted to create a logical and predictable theory
for when its interest in the potentiality of human life takes precedence
over the interest in the privacy of the pregnant woman. This inquiry
is difficult because no lasting jurisprudence exists concerning when a
fetus has rights, outside of the Roe v. Wade scenario. Coercive actions
against pregnant, drug addicted women - or girls - create fetalmaternal conflict. The coercive actions separate the inseparable," and
focus upon the wrong thing - an organism about whose legal status
mothers, philosophers, moralists, jurists, and society in general cannot
agree.' 9 Such coercive actions victimize a mother who is already a
victim, and whose child has, among other things, to look forward to
being raised by an ex-convict.
The impossibility of distinguishing mother from fetus has led to
an anomalous treatment by different jurisdictions in different areas
of the law. In Australia, abortion is murder, plain and simple. 20 In
17. See Jailed Because She is Pregnant;A Superior Court Judge Went Beyond
His Duty, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 1988, at C8. In one case,.a pregnant woman went
to the police for help and protection from an abusive partner; she was thereupon
arrested for abusing her fetus. The plight of Pamela Rae Stewart provides another
example. She began to hemorrhage after she was forced to have sex with her husband.
She was arrested after seeking medical help. People v. Stewart, No. M. 50819, slip
op. (San Diego Mun. Ct., Cal. Feb. 26, 1987); see Tamar Lewin, Drug Use in
Pregnancy:New Issues for the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1990, at A14.
18. I am not alone in this confusion about how a state can focus on a part of
a woman and call it, literally, a plaintiff. See Patricia Williams, Fetal Fictions: An
Exploration of Property Archetypes in Racial and Gendered Contexts, 42 FLA. L.
REV. 81 (1990). "I do not believe that a fetus is a separate person from the moment
of conception. How could it be? It is so interconnected, so flesh-and-blood-bonded,
so completely part of a woman's body. Why try to carve one from the other?" Id.
at 92.
19. It is analogous to the treatment pregnant women get from their doctors.
"[The] psychosocial aspects of pregnancy and childbirth are given too little weight
in the care process, to the detriment of women and their families, because of a focus
on biotechnical aspects of care." CHARLOTTE MULLER, HEALTH CARE AND GENDER
171 (1991). Muller also argues that service and care providers decide which patients
"deserve" care, (e.g., often not including lesbians who want fertility treatment) and
cites doctors' willingness to be more paternalistic toward poorer patients.
20. COLIN HOWARD, CRIMINAL LAW (4th ed, 1982). "There are three indictable
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the United States, it is not so clear. For example, the People of the
State of Minnesota convicted a man of double homicide when he
killed a woman who was, unknown to him, twenty-seven days pregnant. 2' The defendant was charged under a state law denominated
"Murder of an Unborn Child in the First Degree. ' ' 22 The name itself
could be drawn from a Eugene Ionesco play. But somehow, it is not
absurd to hold a murderer accountable for the life he took and the
potential life he prevented. This man was not, according to the court,
denied his Fourteenth Amendment rights by a statute that failed to
23
distinguish between viable and non-viable fetuses.
A New York judge refused, however, to convict for a vehicular
homicide a drunk driver who struck the car of a seven-month pregnant
woman whose child was stillborn. "The heart of the issue herein is
not whether this seven-month fetus ... was a person in any philosophical, religious or even medical sense; but whether she was a
person in a legal sense [under the statute]."24 The legislature defined
a person protected by the criminal vehicular homicide law as "a
human being who has been born and is alive." ' 25 Ironically, the state
also defined who qualified as a person in some other contexts.
"Person" for the purposes of murder, manslaughter, negligent homicide or abortion is defined as a fetus more than twenty-four weeks
old. 'Could the unborn person in Vercelletto have been murdered, as
long as an automobile was not the instrument of her death?
Even more absurd is the Missouri statute, upheld by the Supreme
Court in Webster v..Reproductive Health Services, 26 which proclaims
"the life of each human being begins at conception" and that "unborn
'27
children have protectable interests in life, health, and well-being.
The logical interface of Webster and Roe, as applied in Missouri,
means that a pregnant woman can exercise her constitutional rights
and can terminate "the life of [a] human being," this life having, by
statute, begun at conception. In another case in that same state, a
woman urged that her fetus was unlawfully jailed and suffered cruel
offenses connected with abortion: the attempted abortion of V by D; the attempted
abortion of V by V herself; and the supply of means for abortion with knowledge
that those means are intended to be used for that purpose." Id. at 146-47 (citing
Australian Crimes Act (N.S.W.), §§ 82-84).
21. State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318 (Minn. 1990).
22. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.2661 (West 1988).
23. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d at 321-22.
24. People v. Vercelletto, 514 N.Y.S.2d 177, 178 (Ulster County Ct. 1987).
25. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05 (McKinney 1987).
26. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
27. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 1.205 (Vernon 1986).
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and unusual punishment without due process of law, simply because
she was serving time. 28 The fetus lost. But what miserable irony if it
had not, and if coercive actions that resulted in imprisonment or
commitment of pregnant drug addicts, while protecting fetuses from
the debilitating effects of demon drugs, denied them their constitutional rights as "unborn persons?"
The Illinois Supreme Court has also struggled with the concept
of how to treat a fetus outside the framework of the Roe abortion
context. In Stallman v. Youngquist, 29 the Illinois Supreme Court
rejected the notion of tort liability of mothers for negligently inflicted
prenatal injuries. The Court dismissed the stereotypical view of a
mother's role as "guarantor of the mind and body of her child at
birth." 30 The court found no fetal rights superior to those of its own
mother when it stated:
It is clear that the recognition of a legal right to begin life
with a sound mind and body on the part of a fetus which is
assertable after birth against its mother would have serious
ramifications for all women and their families, and for the
way society views women and women's reproductive abilities.3
It strains our concepts of personal integrity to consider a woman as
of no greater importance than as a fetal environment.
Even the pro-life movement offers no consistent constitutional
or moral theory that supports coercive actions against pregnant women
to protect the health of their unborn. Their adherents oppose most
abortions as murder. They maintain, however, that abortion must be

at B5.

28. Missouri Fetus Unlawfully Jailed, Suit Says, N.Y. Timms, Aug. 11, 1989,

29. 531 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. 1988).
30. Id. at 359.
31. Id. The Stallman court likely would agree with some feminist criticism.

Many of the proponents of taking these pregnant women by force, however, are men

who have not had to be sterilized to save their jobs and who have not experienced

pregnancy or tried to avoid it, or had to deal with the consequences in exactly the

same way as a woman. Williams, supra note 18, at 88 (commenting on the appellate
court's refusal to find less restrictive alternatives to fetal protections in UAW v.
Johnson Controls Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 891 (7th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1196

(1991), and stating "why not confine all women to the home, keep the liquor under
lock and key, and feed them a constant diet of whole grains and antibiotics, like

brood hens?"). "[Elvery woman should consider herself pregnant on the first day
her period is due and avoid exposure to anything that has been implicated in birth
defects." Margery W. Shaw, Conditional Prospective Rights of the Fetus, 5 J.LEG.
MED. 63, 73 (1984) (citing Fran Pollner, The Revolution in Fetal Health Care, MED.
WORLD NEWS, Sept. 12, 1983, at 65, 77 (1983)).
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available to rape and incest victims. 3 2 Consequently, abortion is moral,
and should be legal, only when the woman did not deserve to become
pregnant, that is, when the pregnancy did not result from her voluntary act.33 This inconsistency is apparent as well in the application of
coercion to the pregnant drug user. The coercion by society is motivated, at least in part, by a desire to make the drug user accept
responsibility for her acts, even if she is mentally and physically
unable.
In the abortion context such coercion is virtually foreclosed.
Husbands, boyfriends, and even parents of minors cannot prevent a
woman from having an abortion. 34 A father cannot force a woman
to abort, even if he agrees to pay for an abortion, in order to avoid
an eventual order to pay child support." One court reasoned, however,
that a man, who, together with his ex-wife, arranged to freeze her
ova fertilized by his sperm, can prevent that ex-wife from donating
those preembryos to a childless couple. 6 The lower court gave the
mother "custody" of the ova, and awarded both "parents" joint
control over the fertilized ova with equal voice over their disposition.37
32. Four years ago, I sat in amazement outside the auditorium of the university
where I worked, and listened to a presidential debate in which George Bush condemned abortion as murder, and, without skipping a beat, asserted the right of rape
victims to commit that kind of murder. Nobody asked the Vice-President if it made
sense to allow the "murder" of an unborn child whose life resulted from a sexual
assault by a stranger - a rapist - but to illegalize the abortion of a fetus that
resulted from an unwanted sexual assault by a husband, where there is no such thing
as marital rape? Is a rape victim less of a mother, is her fetus less of a person, than
a woman who is financially, physically or spiritually unable to care for a child and
whose fetus can, nevertheless, be legally disposed of - much to the dismay of the
Right-to-Life movement?
33. Some scholars maintain that most pregnancies among poor, especially black
drug users are not voluntary, but do indeed result from rape, incest, or the
nonavailability of abortion. See Dorothy E. Roberts, PunishingDrug Addicts Who
Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARv. L.
REv. 1419, 1445 n.139 (1991).
34. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct 2791 (1992); Ohio v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990); Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979);
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
35. Harris v. State, 356 So. 2d 623 (Ala. 1978).
36. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992) (limiting its final holding
to the donation context because of the equal right of the husband to avoid procreation), cert. denied, Stowe v. Davis, 113 S. Ct. 1259 (1993).
37. Davis v. Davis, 59 U.S.L.W. 2205 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990)
(unpublished decision), aff'd, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). In affirming the appellate
court, the Supreme Court of Tennessee clarified the interest at issue in the lower
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The court reasoned that it is "repugnant and offensive to constitu-

tional principles" to require the ex-husband "to bear the psychologi''
cal, if not the legal, consequences of paternity against his will. 3

The Tennessee Supreme Court had no greater ideas of what to
do with these ova. Employing a balancing test in its final determina-

tion, the court essentially commanded the progenitors to agree to their
disposition. The court recognized, however, that the father's interest
in avoiding parenthood, and his inability to establish a relationship

with a child born from the implantation of these ova, was more
significant and deserved greater protection than his ex-wife's interest
in giving her ova to a woman who wanted a child. The court
recognized the mother's "not insubstantial emotional burden" 3 9 of
having undergone painful, lengthy, and expensive in vitro fertilization
procedures, but could offer her no solace. The court found a man
has a fundamental right "to procreational autonomy." 4 No one can

tell him he must father a child. The court's support of the man's

right not to procreate seems inconsistent with the decisions under Roe

which do not allow a father to force an abortion on an unwilling
mother 41

court's decision by rejecting that the preembryos were "property" or that they were
"life" as those terms are understood in the legal sense. Justice Daughtrey held,
consistent with the ethical code of the American Fertility Society, that "the gamete
providers have primary decision-making authority regarding preembryos," that the
preembryos are "entitle[d] ... to special respect because of their potential for human

life," and that the gamete providers have an interest, similar to ownership, in
decision-making. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597. Although the lower appellate court
granted joint custody to Mary Sue and Junior, "the true effect [in their case was] to
confer on Junior the inherent power to veto any transfer of the preembryos," id. at
598 (using contract analysis), because if Junior refused to agree on their ultimate
disposition, the preembryos would become inviable after a lapse of time. In Tennessee,
therefore, the man and woman, gamete providers, have equal decision-making
authority as long as they can reach agreement. If their situation indicates to the court
that they are unable to reach agreement, then the man's right to avoid procreation
becomes paramount if the woman has another opportunity to achieve genetic parenthood.
38. Davis, 59 U.S.L.W. at 2206.
39. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604.
40. Id. at 601. The right to procreational autonomy, including the equivalent
rights "to procreate and ...

to avoid procreation," arises from the concept of liberty

embodied in both the federal and Tennessee constitutions and expressed as an
individual right to privacy. Id. at 598-601.
41. The Davis court distinguished the equal interest held by both gamete
providers from the exclusive right held by a woman to make an abortion decision
during the first three months of pregnancy following implantation of the preembryos
when presumably a court could not enforce a contract against a woman because her
autonomy is absolute in relation to her spouse during this time period. Id. at 597.
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Some argue that fetal rights advocates who support coercive
actions against pregnant drug users are simply trying to undercut a
woman's abortion options. 42 The argument is that by increasing fetal
rights, there is a greater ability to protect fetuses from the action of
its mother. An example of an attempt to limit the abortion rights of
women through the use of fetal rights took place in Illinois. The state
passed a law that required physicians to advise women who wanted
an abortion of the "possibility of fetal pain." Although the statute
was declared unconstitutional, 43 it did not stop its proponents from
trying to burden and compound the pain of the living, viable, pregnant
woman, for the good of a fetus that everyone agreed was not medically
viable.
An alternative argument can be made that coercive acts against
pregnant women may encourage them to abort their fetuses, rather
than be subject to criminal or civil prosecution for neglect or delivery
of drugs. This may be a straw man, since abortion is likely not an
affordable option. But it does present a conundrum. Advocates for
the unborn cannot hope to encourage their destruction to obviate
their neglect. However remote the possibility, it adds to the lack of
coherent philosophy or legal precedent to justify coercive acts.
The most famous attempt to delineate the legal rights of women
and fetuses is under attack. Roe v. Wade is undergoing either refinement or outright reversal. This leaves only the inchoate, unarticulated
and untested legislation by the states as a guide. A fetus can sue in
tort," or be murdered by a third person - sometimes. 45 Not every
court agrees about when a fetus becomes a legal person, and some
become persons for one purpose but not another.
This inconsistency prevents us from analyzing the system. At the
least it requires us to acknowledge that there is no consistency, which
suggests a failure of the system. After that paradigmatic failure, we
might next look at a type of sociological jurisprudence: how does law
affect the parties and the society in which we all live? Whether fetuses
42. Dawn E. Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's
Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599,
611 (1986).

43. Charles v. Carey, 579 F. Supp. 464 (N.D. Ill. 1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, Charles v. Daley, 749 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1984). The statute under review was
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-26 (1983).
44. In the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions who have considered the
issue, the fetus must be born alive to bring suit. See State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625,
628-29 (Minn. 1985) (discussing the majority rule).

45. See supra note 25.
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have rights can be looked at in terms of how the rest of society is
affected by our resolution of these issues. To put it simply, is the
world a better place - is the common weal improved - by coercive
actions against pregnant women?
The current approach toward control of drug problems and
protection of the unborn has historical precedent. In England and
America, social change was demanded by members of the Eugenics
Movement, which by and large functioned to encourage strengthening
and preservation of the race through compulsory sterilization of
women who were likely to produce defective offspring. 46 Part of the
Movement in Victorian England was a fifteen-year experiment in
which alcoholic women were sent to reformatories in "a propitious
rural environment" where they were subjected to "a variety of positive
moral influences. '47 This endeavor was undertaken because imprisonment of these women for their alcoholism, which accounted for
the greatest number of women in prison, had failed miserably.
As in the case of addicted pregnancy, the social and practical
costs were high for female drunks who gave birth to, and often
neglected, their sickly children. Victorians were burdened, not unlike
contemporary Americans, with "heightened anxiety about the eugenic
implications of female crime." ' 48 The worst element of female crimi46. See, e.g., William T. Vukowich, The Dawning of the Brave New World Legal, Ethical, and Social Issues of Eugenics, 1971 U. ILL. L. REV. 189. Despite the

horror inspired by hindsight, the movement was motivated by a sincere desire to
improve society, and protect the unborn, by literally preventing their conception.
47. LuciA

ZEDNER,

WOMEN, CRIME, AND CUSTODY IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND

6

(1991).
48. Id. at 5. In describing the case of a woman prosecuted for inebriety, the
secretary of a large prison-reform group in England at the turn of the century, wrote:
She had been a good wife and mother till late in life. Then her children had
all dispersed, and great loneliness had come upon her. It was the old, old
story of drink, neglect, waste, and dirt-no food provided, no house made
tidy, no beds made, no washing of clothes.
T.H.

HOLMES, KNOWN TO THE POLICE

60-3 (1908), cited in

ZEDNER,

supra note 50,

at 28. Or consider this cavalier determination of a woman's criminality - or her
unfitness for the care and custody of her child. "When a woman gets to be utterly
careless of her personal appearance - personal cleanliness - you may be sure that
she is careful for nothing else that is good." M.E. Owen, Criminal Women, CORNHILL
MAG., 14, 155 (1866), cited in ZEDNER, supra note 51, at 28. Compare Hopkins v.

Price-Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), where a woman was denied partnership at a
large accounting firm because she was not feminine enough. Justice Marshall asked

the attorney for the company whether male partners also had to have their hair done
to be promoted there. Cf. Ellen Goodman, A Warning on Warnings, BOSTON GLOBE,
April 4, 1991, at 11 (discussing a situation in which waiters in a restaurant questioned
a pregnant woman who ordered a drink as to whether she knew the dangers of
drinking, demonstrating that everyone polices the pregnant).
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nality was the woman's failure, especially as a mother, to live up to
the feminine ideal: chaste, moral, generous, religious. As one wellknown preacher of the time remarked, "Woe to that country in which
men are not able to consider women as living lives on the whole more
'49
sober, righteous, and godly than their own."
A century later, one may argue, zealots who champion the rights
of fetuses are no less sexist, and infinitely less humane than their
predecessors. Unlike the Eugenics advocates, I hear of no efforts to
remove these poor addicts to idyllic environs with quality medical
care and nurturing drug counselors. In addition, unlike their forebears, these modern protectors perpetrate invidious racial discrimination, an evil spared the homogeneous British a century ago. Even
more reprehensibly, we do not appear as willing to abandon the
historically worthless and dangerous idea.
Thus, the legal status of fetuses seems to elude lawmakers, except
in two circumstances: when it is nonviable and subject to being aborted
by an adult woman who can afford to terminate her pregnancy, and
when its mother uses drugs.
II.

COERCIVE ACTIONS ARE NEITHER FAIR NOR JUST

Government actors have three choices in dealing with pregnant
drug addicts. They can leave them alone; they can affirmatively assist
them; they can punish them. It is impossible to be sanguine about
our societal motives when the government has rejected the first two
approaches, and when the brunt of its punitive acts are borne by the
least powerful, women in general, and specifically women of color,
with no concomitant help for them in the herculean task of overcoming the poverty, addiction and second-class citizenship caused by our
own racism and class structures. Women are measured against a malecreated eurocentric standard of gender propriety. Demands and legal
obligations are made upon mothers which fathers can evade. And
when fetuses and women are victimized by tortious and criminal
actions, they are given scant protections or redress.
A.

SOCIETY DEMANDS SEXUAL PROPRIETY FROM WOMEN

From King Solomon to Spike Lee, we have been constrained to
do the right thing. Although coke babies suffer more than their nonaddicted infant peers, rending what families they have satisfies no
theory of fairness. We have tried to justify coercive acts by stamping
49. ZEDNER, supra note 47, at 14 (citing J.W. HORSLEY, JOTTINGS FROM JAIL

62 (1887)).
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them with the imprimatur of rightness. But, as with our lack of a
coherent and consistent legal system of stare decisis in this area, there
is no universally right and just way of handling the problem of
,substance-abusing mothers.
Philosophers refer to "legal moralism" as the principle which
justifies limitations upon individual liberties in order to enforce
conventional moral beliefs. 0 One noted English scholar argues: "If
the reasonable man believes that a practice is immoral and believes
also -

no matter whether the belief is right or wrong . .. that no

right-minded member of his society could think otherwise, then for
the purposes of the law it is immoral."'" This could be a neat way of
justifying coercive acts against women, despite the absence of a legal
system, and regardless of its efficacy or practical impossibility; all
our notions of legal order rest upon this guarantee of the morally
correct.
The biggest problem with this moral schema is that "it is highly
unlikely that a melting-pot society could produce a consensus on what
is moral or immoral ....
*"I2 The public's disagreement after Roe v.
Wade is a perfect example of our collective inability to define what
is moral, and therefore legally enforceable. If we are honest, and
attempt to consider the opinions of the less politically powerful women and people of color or ethnic minorities - the opinions would
be even more diverse. Therefore, no articulable, logical and cogent
legal basis for the present paternalism toward the fetus exists, and no
practical justification for coercive acts against pregnant drug addicts
as a benefit to society follows.
At least some of the state's activity is likely motivated by the
belief that pregnancy is what a sexually active woman "deserves."
Such a view is analogous to viewsl of date or acquaintance rape that
consider the male's determination to have sex with a woman against
her will just "punishment for her boldness, carelessness, or fantasies." 53 The least a pregnant addict can do for the poor misbegotten
50. TONG, supra note 5, at 39.

51. LORD PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 11 (1965).

52. TONG, supra note 5, at 40.
53. Id. at 103; see also Tamar Lewin, Woman has Abortion, Violating Court's
Order on PaternalRights, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1988, at A26. An Indiana trial court,

apparently ignoring Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), recognized

"parental rights" of petitioner, and enjoined his girlfriend from having an abortion.
The trial judge, obviously never having been pregnant himself, noted that "the only
distress associated with the continuing pregnancy was [the woman's] wish to look
nice in a bathing suit this summer." Id. The Supreme Court of Indiana reversed in
Doe v. Smith, 527 N.E.2d 177 (Ind. 1988) (per curiam).
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product of her promiscuity is care for it the way the majority sees
fit. As one writer made this point fifteen years ago, in a "modern"
analysis of sex crime:
The social and legal control of sexual behavior is based, on
the one hand, on the need felt in many societies for the
channeling of sex drives into forms of conduct leading to
procreation, stable family units, and care and socialization of
the child (with unquestioned knowledge of paternity in order

to ensure proper passing on of property).

....

54

Ironically, none of these goals is satisfied by coercive acts; the addict
has already procreated.
The stability a family unit may have is bound to be shaken by
the altruism of the police, the social workers, and the judge of
heightened social consciousness. The newborn or the young child
whose pregnant mother got all the attention from the state is uncared
for and forgotten. While her father, also blessed by the beneficence
of the state, has no property to pass on to his crack heir. Coercive
acts seem, anachronistically, to be fueled by the assumption "that the
libido, or sexual drive, is a force that has antisocial potential."" 5
Many philosophers have identified the basically misogynistic views
of the early theologians as having an unmitigated effect on legal
theory and practice centuries later.5 6 To wit:
A good christian is found toward one and the same woman,
to love the creature of god whom he desires to be transformed
and renewed, but to hate in her the corruptible and mortal
sexual intercourse and all that pertains
conjugal connection,
7
wife.
a
as
to her
Righteous Professor Wigmore noted the female propensity "of contriving false charges of sexual offenses by men." 8 Comparing coercive
acts against pregnant addicts to socio-legal treatment of sex crimes
against women, and sexual harassment of women, shows misogyny
pervades our legal redress systems. The misogynous character of our
54. DO NAL E.J. MACNAMARA & EDWARD SAGARIN, SEX, CRIME, AND THE LAW
1 (1977).
55. Id.
56. See generally ROSEMARY RUETHER, LIBERATION THEOLOGY (1972); GEORGE
H. TAVARD, WOMEN IN CHRISTIAN TRADITION (1973).
57. RUETHER, supra note 56, at 103 (quoting the writings of St. Augustine).
58. TONG, supra note 5, at 101 (citing JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 379
(1934)).
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legal system makes it difficult, if not impossible, to prove that a man
did something to a woman that she did not deserve. 9 It is as if
modern jurists believe the anachronistic and degrading view of women
held by a Georgia Supreme Court judge 150 years ago:
[No] evil habitude of humanity so depraves the nature, so
deadens the moral sense, and obliterates the distinctions between right and wrong, as common, licentious indulgence.
Particularly is this true of women, the citadel whose character
is virtue; when that is lost, all is gone; her love of justice,
sense of character, and regard for truth. 60
A woman without virtue cannot properly raise a child. No wonder
we need not concern ourselves with best-interest hearings before taking
custody of the offspring of a female alcoholic or an addict. The old
worry - "Was she asking for it?" - plagues so much of our
jurisprudence, and accounts for at least part of our collective demand
for protection of the unborn at the expense of the woman who gave
it life.
Our societal and legal views of rape cast light on how society
justifies punitive actions against the pregnant drug user. Look, for
example, at this frighteningly recent and candid view of what some
powerful and respected men think of rape:
Many experts in the field of legal medicine believe 'that rape
cannot be perpetrated by one man alone on an adult woman
of good health and vigor.' Medico-legal experts therefore tend
to regard all accusations of rape made under such circumstances as false. For example, Beck [1863] states in his treatise
on medical jurisprudence . . . 'I have intimated that doubts
exist whether a rape can be consummated on a grown female
59. Fear of the false complainant is generally not borne out in rape statistics.

See generally SUSAN

BROWNMILLER,

AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE

(1975). For more information about this subject, contact Dr. Pauline Bart, Dept of
Psychiatry: University of Illinois at Chicago, who has written extensively on this
topic.
One district court judge found that a woman who had posed semi-nude for a
motorcycle magazine could not legally experience sexual harassment when her male
coworkers made obscene sexual requests. The appellate court in Burns v. McGregor
Electronic Industries Inc., 955 F.2d 559 (8th Cir. 1992), reversed the district court
and instructed it to determine whether the plaintiff, despite her nude modeling, was
"at least as affected as that hypothetical reasonable person." Id. at 566. The Court
made clear that it did not demand that the district court, on remand, find in
plaintiff's favor. Id.
60. Camp v. State, 3 Ga. 417, 422 (1847).
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The opinion of medical
61

Pregnant drug addicts have visible signs of their sins upon their very
bodies: needle tracks and bellies. As in the case of the unchaste
women and rape, these signs of sin prevent women from securing
62
protection under the law.
It seems that a plausible explanation for coercive actions against
pregnant women can be found in the historic legal stereotypes held
about them. It has been difficult for women to convince male lawmakers and judges that discrimination, harassment, and even rape
should be illegal and severely punished. In part, it has been difficult
because women are viewed as paragons, whose descent into vice merit
their victimization. The most modern example of this misogyny is
demonstrated by coercive acts against pregnant women.
B. FATHERS ARE NOT HELD TO THE SAME STANDARD OF CARE AS
MOTHERS

Except for what society considers the grossest improprieties incest, pedophilia, and perhaps sexual orientation, 63 a man's sexuality
170 (1951), quoted in MACNAMARA
supra note 54, at 35-36.
62. State v. Snow, 252 S.W. 629 (Mo. 1923) The court cleared "otherwise
blameless" young men from the statutory rape of an under-age prostitute stating
that "[a] lecherous woman is a social menace; she is more dangerous than T.N.T.;
more deadly than the 'pestilence that walketh in darkness or the destruction that
wasteth at noonday."' Id. at 632. The statute involved imposed strict criminal liability
upon any male who had intercourse with an underage girl, regardless of her consent
or character. Id. at 631. The defendant was convicted of a statutory rape against a
fifteen-year-old girl, who testified that she had engaged in intercourse with the
defendant and with several other men. Id. at 630. In overturning the defendant's
conviction, the court noted that the girl was a prostitute. Id. at 632. Consequently,
the men involved were "more sinned against than sinning" because of their immaturity and the girl's influence. Id. at 632.
Eventually, the court overturned the defendant's conviction based on the prosecutor's prejudicial statement that "[the defendant] gives no more for that girl tonight [sic], gentlemen, think of it, not a spark of love has ever trickled in his heart
for that girl, but all he cares for is to satisfy his lustful desires and his fiendish
disposition towards women." Id. at 632.
63. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1039
(1986). It is ironic that our football hero, Justice "Whizzer" White, found that the
fundamental right to privacy that'gave unmarried heterosexuals the right to practice
birth control bore no "resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals
to engage in acts of sodomy." Id. at 191. Just as drug addiction is too sinful to be
an illness, sexual preference is too non-majoritarian to be a normal subset of personal
61.

MORRIS PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAW

AND SAGARIN,
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is his own private affair. Even when he transgresses some law, for
example, by forcibly raping a woman, he is often forgiven or only
minimally punished. 64 The double standard has been addressed for
generations, with no particular change in attitude.
Attempts at equalizing treatment of both genders for sex-related
improprieties has fallen flat because of the gender-specific physical
differences which highlight such "crimes" as premarital coitus. Cases
involving unmarried parenting have a greater impact on the women
who show their status, than on men, who do not. For example, in
Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc. ,6S the court found that a private
non-profit organization that served primarily poor African-American
girls could fire a poor young African-American woman who was
.single and pregnant. The club claimed its mission was to help its
clients overcome poverty and eschew single motherhood, among other
evils, and to provide them "with exposure to the greatest number of
available positive options in life." 6 Consequently, firing Crystal
Chambers was a legitimate business necessity. According to the club,
Crystal Chambers failed to be a proper role model for the girls with
whom she worked. Her choice was to pursue her career, but not to
abort her child. That a child would be raised by a hardworking,
professionally-employed mother was not a "positive option" valued
by the Omaha Girls Club. There was no discussion of whether the
father of Crystal's fetus worked there. That surely is a different case,
because the result of his promiscuity was not physically evident like
Ms. Chamber's distended stomach.
Another example of the different standard men and women are
held to involves child support obligations. There is a failure and
refusal of family law courts to make fathers support living children, 67
relationships protected by law. The Court refused to accept plaintiffs' argument in
Hardwick that the moral judgment of a majority of Georgians was inadequate to
meet the rational basis test. See Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1398 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (accepting the Navy's argument that homosexuality threatened discipline and
moral in that branch of the Armed Services because it "generate[d] dislike and
disapproval among many who find homosexuality morally offensive. . . ."); Padula
v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (FBI can exclude gays for security reasons;
homosexuals are neither a suspect nor quasi-suspect class).
64. See, e.g., State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441 (Alaska 1977).
65. 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987). For a thoughtful critique of this decision, see
Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 539.
66. Chambers, 834 F.2d at 701.
67. See Lorraine Schmall, Women and Children First, But Only if the Men are
Union Members: Hiring Halls and Delinquent Child-Supporters,6 NOTRE DAME J.L.

ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y

449 (1992).
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much less the unborn. Courts are loathe to enforce delinquent child
supporters by incarceration because of a perception that putting men
in jail will net no real support money for the children.6 8 Although
one could argue that most of the critics of coercive actions to enforce
child support obligations are men, it is fair, considering the serious
impact of these state actions, to question their efficacy. As one scholar
noted:
[I]mprisonment for nonsupport has obvious disadvantages: it
is expensive for the state and no income for the children is
going to be generated while the fathers are in jail. Its justification, despite these drawbacks, therefore, depends upon its
efficacy in specific and general deterrence: do men who are
actually jailed learn their lesson and pay in the future, and
does the threat of jail deter disobedience to support orders by
fathers who otherwise shirk their obligations?69
The fact is, data shows that jail is a very effective way to make
fathers pay. 70
The justification for punishment in child support cases is empirically proven; jail deters both specifically and generally, and it rehabilitates the chronic nonsupporter. Jail is a drastic measure that could
have serious effects upon the families of those incarcerated. But if we
refuse to solve the problem of delinquent child support with coercive
acts, why do we approve their use against poor, sick, addicted
pregnant women? Fairness dictates that the same considerations be
taken on their behalf as those taken for delinquent child supporters.
Similar suggestions that coercive acts for the benefit of the unborn
be directed at fathers as well as mothers, although laudable for their
recognition of sexual discrimination, 7 are as implausible as changing
the results in Chambers and having that embryo's father fired from
his job. Physiology makes a difference. Female defendants deliver
drugs through the umbilical cord. In few, if any, cases could a state
68.

ROBERT MNOOKIN &

69.

CALEB FOOTE ET AL.,

(1989).
1985).

70. See

(1986).

KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE

CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW

DAVID L. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY

CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT,
MARIES OF

D.

REPORTS BY STATE

U.S.

234

108 (3d ed.

(1979); see also

OFFICE OF

DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SUM-

COMMISSIONS

ON CHILD SUPPORT

ENFORCEMENT

Xii

71. See Jeffrey A. Parness, Prospective Fathers and Their Unborn Children,

13 U. ARK.

LITTLE ROCK L.J.

165 (1991).
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prove the father's "delivery" of a drug to an unborn child. Furthermore, suggesting that fathers "make" women who are carrying their
unborn children take drugs harkens back to the antiquated and
erroneous notion that women have no autonomy. Granted, drug
addicts have little free will if the notion of addiction is accepted for
both what it denotes and what it connotes, but such attempts at
equalizing treatment of expectant mothers and fathers merely reinforces gender distinctions and disparate treatment.
Child abuse and neglect actions against fathers are not practical
either. Only one court in the country has reported a case where a
father was found to have parental responsibilities to his unborn child,
and even in that case it was by inference and not by coercion or
command. Fathers, married or not, are not prosecuted for failing to
support a pregnant woman and provide a fetus with necessaries. One
Florida judge did prevent a father from interfering with his girlfriend's
decision to place their illegitimate child for adoption, because as the
court noted, the father did not support his girlfriend while she was
pregnant and such behavior evinced his intent to abandon his child.72
Consequently, state law deprived him of his right to interfere with
the mother's choice. This was a radical notion - and a good effort
on the part of a judge attempting to deal fairly and even-handedly,
but the judge imposed no direct responsibilities on the man. Instead,
as in many cases, the court reinforced traditional notions of ownership
and obligation.
Men are not arrested for child abuse or prosecuted for neglect
after having used illegal drugs which are known to adversely affect
sperm." Nor are there reported cases of removing children from the
custody of a father who is arrested for drunk driving, or possession
and use of cocaine, or use of a dangerous weapon while minding his
children. Would we not take those coercive actions if we were really
72. In re Adoption of Doe, 543 So. 2d 741, 749 (Fla.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
964 (1989).
73. See Mary E. Becker, Can Employers Exclude Women to Protect Children?,
264 JAMA 2113, 2114 (1990) (stating that "[ilronically, rational concern ... would
more likely result in policies limiting ... fertile men, since there have been more
documented claims of harm to children of male workers than to children of female
workers."); Kary Moss, Substance Abuse During Pregnancy, 13 HARv. WoMiEN'S
L.J. 278, 286 (1990) (citing Felissa Cohen, Paternal Contributions to Birth Defects,
NURSING CLINICS N. AM., Mar. 1986, at 49); Ricardo A. Yazigi et al., Demonstration
of Specific Binding of Cocaine to Human Spermatozoa, 266 JAMA 1956 (1991)
(noting that exposure of males to cocaine has been linked to abnormal development
of their offspring).
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interested in the welfare of the child, and not merely hell-bent on
perpetuating sex discrimination?
Fathers rarely assume the same type or degree of responsibility
for children as mothers. 74 Data reveals that fathers are less involved
in family planning. Pregnancy normally results, except in the case of
forcible rape, from intentional acts on the part of both partners. But
[v]irtually all Medicaid-financed family planning services, however, are provided to women . . . and almost all sterilizations
are performed on women. In 1978, the last year for which a
breakdown was available, 88.1 percent of sterilizations were
tubal ligations, 2.0 percent -were hysterectomies, 5.6 percent
were other female procedures, and 4.2 percent were vasecto-

mies .7

76
Women have been victims of introgenesis in medical control of birth.
Imposing sanctions against a woman for harming herself, and her
child, by failing to do what she has neither the emotional, social nor
financial ability to do, legitimizes the theory that only the woman is
the primary caretaker, 77 and she must bear the burden of doing her
pregnancy right.
This disparate obligation exists as well in the post-birth responsibilities that tend to fall more heavily upon women than men.
Accompanying those childcare responsibilities are the psychic duties
that society imposes only upon the mother. Modern psychoanalytic
theory reinforced age-old notions that mothers are to be censured and too rarely praised - for the way their children's psyches develop.
In the writings of Sigmund Freud, women are considered masochistic,

74. NEIL KALTER, GROWING UP WITH DIVORCE 10 (1990); Vicki Schultz, Telling
Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretation of Sex Segregation in the
Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1749, 1810 n.231 (1990).
75. MULLER, supra note 19, at 158 (citing UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION, MEDICARE

AND MEDICAID DATA BOOK

tbl. 2.20 (1983)).

76. Joan Steinman, Women, Medical Care and Mass Tort Litigation, 68 CHI.-(1992) (forthcoming). See generally CAROL H. LEFCOURT, WOMEN
KENT L. REv.
AND THE LAW (1984) (discussing IUD's, oral contraceptives, and spermicidal jelly
and women's historic responsibility, regardless of cost).
77. See Regina v. Conde, 10 Cox Crim. Cas. 547 (1867) (convicting a mother
of manslaughter when she negligently withheld food, causing her child's death by
starvation, but acquitting the father in the same case); accord Regina v. Nichols, 13
Cox Crim. Cas. 75, 76 (1874) (where the finding suggests that the woman was more
responsible than the man and therefore more culpable and likely to be punished
where a child dies due to willful neglect or intentional starvation).
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narcissistic, and passive. "In this model was found the rationale for
assigning to mothers responsibility for such diverse conditions as
schizophrenia, homosexuality, and eating disorders. Maternity was
interpreted as compensation for psychic inadequacy, rather than as
positive creation .... ,,78 In addition, it embraces the traditional view
that women who fail, or become addicted to drugs or alcohol, or
become criminals, are more culpable than men who do the same
thing.
Criminality is also seen as more serious when the actor is female
than when the actor is male. Addressing the Social Science Association
in England in 1883, one scholar argued that female criminality (most
of it prostitution and alcoholism), though quantitatively insignificant,
was a serious problem:
for female crime has a much worse effect on the morals of
the young, and is therefore of a far more powerfully depraving
character, than the crimes of men ....
[T]he influence and
the example of the mother are all powerful: and corruption,
if it be there, exists in the source and must taint the stream. 79
Self studies of gender bias called for by the Conference of Chief
Justices have uncovered serious discrimination in almost every area
of the law, ranging from open hostility to sheer inability to empathize.
"Judges may not understand or may ignore the life experiences of
those whose lives are so different from their own. ' 80 Courts that
cannot accommodate pregnant lawyers - women with education,
experience and social class nearly the same as the judges, may feel
even less disposed toward pregnant junkies, with a few other children.8 1
The disparity between women and men exists even in judicial
custody determinations. Judicial decisions removing a child from a
mother or assuming a mother who tests positive for drugs is neglectful
fail to make a substantive inquiry into the mother's actual fitness. In
78.

MULLER,

supra note 19, at 43.

ZEDNER, supra note 47, at 47.
80. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA,
ACHIEVING EQUAL JUSTICE FOR WOMEN AND MEN IN THE COURTS
2, at 4 (March

79.

§

23, 1990) (draft report).
81. At our university's "Unity in Diversity" celebration, sociologist Angela
Davis reminded her. audience that when we speak of diversity, we must know it
encompasses poor, pregnant addicted black women and their boyfriends ravaged by
gang membership as much as it signifies acceptance of African-American professionals
into our academies and offices.
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every case but those involving coercive actions against pregnant
women, courts generally engage in complex fact-finding and look to
several key factors when considering the best interest of the child.
When courts seek to determine which pareht will get custody, the
court chooses that custodian who is most likely to act in the "best
interest" of the child.
This best interest standard is not a strict test but a fluid determination. Some considerations include ability of a parent to care for
child, the parent's efforts to obtain custody, and evidence showing a
desire to raise the child. The court may also consider a child's
preference. In addition, questions concerning the child's age, maturity,
and any special needs of the child are considered. Courts try to
determine which parent will further establish relationships the child
possesses, including a relationship with the other parent. A further
consideration is whether the child has siblings living with the parent
who may be denied custody. The thought is that keeping siblings
together is usually in the child's best interest. Never has a court
conclusively determined custody based upon a single factor.12 Coercive
actions against pregnant drug addicts has the practical effect of
focusing custody determinations on one narrow factor. The mother
incarcerated for drug abuse, for unrelated crimes, or who is the object
of a state negligence and abuse proceeding to deny her custody because
of her pregnant addicted state, ends up without custody of her child.
This is clearly a different determination than what is in the best
interest of the child.
Courts have dramatically democratized their approaches to child
custody determinations, with the result that women have lost whatever
preference they may have had. Modern case law demonstrates an
ever-heightening standard for custody determination involving fathers'
interests. Within the past two decades, a more or less consistent rule
of giving both parents equal right to a hearing as to their fitness as
parents has evolved. An example of the shift in custody and fitness
determinations can be seen in the law's treatment of custody in cases
involving illegitimate children.
For example, traditionally, the mother of an illegitimate child
had the primary, presumptive right to custody of the child. s3 The
82. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Carney, 598 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1979) (noting that
a father's physical handicap limited his ability to participate in physical activities, yet
holding that a physical handicap is not a final conclusion for denial); Goldstein v.
Goldstein, 341 A.2d 51 (R.I. 1975) (acknowledging that preference is a factor, yet
not conclusory to decision). See generally HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE Law of

Domestic Relations in the United States § 11.5 (1968).

83. See Thomas J. Goger, Annotation, Right of Putative Father to Custody of
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Supreme Court, however, has implied that such presumptions violate
equal protection. In Stanley v. Illinois,84 upon the petition of an
unmarried father, the Court struck down an Illinois statute that made
children wards of the state upon the death of their unmarried mother,
without allowing the unwed father to prove his fitness. The Court
stated: "Indeed, if [the parent] is . . .fit . . . the State spites its own
articulated goals [of protecting the welfare of the child] when it
needlessly separates him from his family." '85 Following such a lead,
many if not most state courts have begun to use the same standards
for custody determinations for both legitimate and illegitimate children, eschewing any presumptions in favor of the mother.8 6
When a pregnant drug user finds herself in the hands of the
state, her after-born child is summarily removed from her in two
ways. First, a child may be removed through a negligence hearing
that offers much less protection of the mother's rights and interests
than a typical custody hearing affords even a putative father.8 7 Second,
the mother may be separated from her child because of her incarceration. In both cases, it is her pregnancy, not her addiction or her
commission of a crime, that affords her less process.
This lack of process is contrary to the expansion of due process
being afforded men in custody cases involving illegitimate children.
In a recent California Supreme Court decision, In re Kelsey S.,8 a
mother sought to place her child with adoptive parents. Subsequently,
the father brought an action to establish his parental relationship.
The court held that if an unmarried father promptly comes forward
and shows full commitment to his parental responsibilities, then due
process protections forbid the termination of his parental relationship
absent a showing of parental unfitness. 9 The court found that the
mother interfered with the father's right to bond with the child by
Illegitimate Child, 45 A.L.R.3d 216 (1972). In some cases, the mother had the
exclusive right to custody of the child.
84. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
85. Id. at 652-53.
86. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Mangan, 537 N.E.2d 960, 962 (Ill.
App. Ct.
1989) (Illinois courts do not assume that mothers are better custodians); In re Marriage
of Lacaeyse, 461 N.W.2d 475, 477 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (parent's gender is irrelevant
when making a custody decision); Visikides v. Derr, 348 S.E.2d 40, 42 (Va. Ct. App.
1986) (neither parent will have a presumption of law in their favor); see also Paul

M. Kurtz, State Equal Rights Amendments and Their Impact on Domestic Relations

Law,'1l
87.
88.
89.

FAM. L.Q. 101, 140 (1977).
See, e.g., In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935 (Ohio C.P. 1986).
In re Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216 (Cal. 1992).
Id. at 1236.
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attempting to allow the adoption without his consent. 90 The father
was granted this right to intervene in the adoption .proceedings, even
though there was no finding that the father ever assumed a parental
role by buying food or necessaries for the mother during her pregnancy. 91 Obviously, courts are sympathetic to putative fathers who do
not meet their obligations to their children, while punishing women
who are less than ideal mothers.
Automatically concluding that a woman addicted to drugs or
alcohol is an unfit parent seems at odds with the judiciary's protection
of children in other circumstances. Examples include sex offenders
being granted unsupervised, partial custody of their own children,
some of whom were victimized by these same fathers. 92 This supports
the conclusions of earlier social observers and policy-makers that
women's crimes were not so much measured by their actual significance or content, but by their proof of a woman's deviation from the
male-described norms of decency. This paternalism and imposition of
values not held by the mother herself can hardly be said to improve
the care of children, nor do they demonstrate the mercy and solicitude
their mothers need.
Unmarried or financially "irresponsible" pregnancy, compounded by drug use during that pregnancy, would not sit well with
judges whose own wives had very different experiences.
"[N]0twithstanding contemporary changes in sexual mores sexual
morality still generates strong emotions in the minds of judges which
are reflected in their judgments either expressly or under the surface." 93 Women, much more often than men, are injured by courts
views of morality.
Courts impose male dominated morality through custody determinations. Courts consistently disregard the suggestion, implied by
the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, that the personal and sexual
90. Id. at 1233-37.
91. Id. at 1237-38.
92. Although parental rights can be terminated, it does not appear that there
are any irrebuttable presumptions which terminate parental rights. See, e.g., In re
Cassandra M., 488 N.Y.S.2d 96 (App. Div. 1985) (holding that father's imprisonment
did not create an irrebuttable presumption that he was an unfit parent); Conkel v.
Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (father's homosexuality cannot be the
per se basis to determine whether he is able to have visitation rights); In re Marriage
of Woffinden, 654 P.2d 1219 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (trial court erred in awarding
custody of children to grandparents solely because father engaged in sexual intercourse
with his daughter from the time she was six until she was twelve years old). See
generally CLARK, supra note 82, at § 20.6.
93. CLARK, supra note 82, at 804.
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conduct of a parent is irrelevant in a custody determination unless it
affects the parent-child relationship. 94 For example, in Jarrett v.
Jarrett,95 a court denied custody to a mother who engaged in "open
and notorious" cohabitation, in violation of Illinois law. The woman,
according to the court, demonstrated improper moral values which
would injure her child's mental and physical health.
One obvious reason more women than men are adversely affected
by a judge's sense of what is right and moral for a child is that more
women than men seek custody. But women are consistently held to a
higher moral standard than men. 96 The only glaring exceptions involve
homosexuals, who like sexually active, aggressive, or drug-addicted
women, do not adopt the gender roles society deems appropriate. 97
Women bear the children, but that does not mean they ought to bear
the burdens unfairly. They are disparaged, abused, unsupported and
now, punished for being biologically different. We must not continue
this historic discrimination.
Professor Regina Austin admonishes us to remember "that condemnation and economic hardships" of the type suffered by pregnant
women who are discharged for being bad role models, or imprisoned
for giving birth to an addicted child, or continuing to bear young
even while on the public dole "are politically and socially contin-

94. UNIF. MARRIAGE

AND

DIVORCE ACT

§ 402,

9A U.L.A. 561 (1968).

95. 400 N.E.2d 421 (I11.
1979); see also McKim v. McKim, 440 So. 2d 562, 563
(Ala. Civ. App. 1983) (taking custody from the mother because she allowed a man
other than her husband to stay regularly overnight in her home); Nix v. Nix, 706
S.W.2d 403 (Ark. Ct. App. 1986) (taking custody because of the mother's immoral
relationship with a married man); Shioji v. Shioji, 712 P.2d 197 (Utah 1985)
(transferring custody because mother permitted boyfriend to sleep at her home
frequently, which had an adverse impact on her children). See generally Annotation,
Custodial Parents' Sexual Relations with Third Person as Justifying Modification of
Child Custody Order, 100 A.L.R.3d 625 (1980) (annotating cases that discuss sexual

relationships of a parent as cause for a custody modification).
96. See, e.g., TONG, supra note 5, at 193-95.
97. Even in those cases, it appears that lesbians are treated more harshly than
gay men. See McGinnis v. McGinnis, 567 So. 2d 390, 392 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990)
(awarding the grandparents custody, basing its decision, in part, on the mother's
involvement in a lesbian relationship while her children lived with her); Thigpen v.
Carpenter, 730 S.W.2d 510, 512-13 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987) (giving custody to the
father where the mother had a lesbian relationship); S v. S,608 S.W.2d 64 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1980) (stating that the mother's open lesbian relationship warranted giving the
father custody), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981). See generally Caroll J.Miller,
Annotation, Visitation Rights of Homosexual or Lesbian Parent, 36 A.L.R.4th 997
(1985).
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gent . . . .[T]hey are not the product of a consensus that holds across
race, sex, and class boundaries." 9
C. OTHERS WHO INJURE FETUSES ARE NOT TREATED AS HARSHLY
AS PREGNANT WOMEN

The strongest argument in support of coercive actions against
pregnant mothers is that they are motivated by a desire to protect
their children. But this rationale loses its strength when one compares
how other sources of fetal injury are treated under the law. The
women who carry these fetuses are dealt with more punitively than
almost any other third parties. Evidence of this disparate treatment
includes mass tort litigation involving injury to fetuses by doctors and
drug companies that prescribed these dangers for women,9 and cigarette and liquor manufacturers who protested violently against even
printing warnings for pregnant women on their products. 1°° Even
husbands and boyfriends who injure the women who carry their
children are no more harshly dealt with. 0 1
Some of the cases where pregnant women were arrested for child
neglect involved their efforts to get away from their abusive boyfriends
or husbands, and in doing so, became the target of prosecution for
endangering their fetuses. There is evidence that the medical profession
is aware of the battering that clearly endangers a fetus as much as or
more than its mother's addictions. "Obstetrician/gynecologists are
now being informed that battering is the major cause of injury to
98. Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 Wisc. L. REV. 539, 553.

99. See Summerfield v. Superior Court, 698 P.2d 712 (Ariz. 1985) (allowing
parents to recover for wrongful death of stillborn, viable fetus when doctors failed
to observe the absence of fetal movement); Jarvis v. Providence Hosp., 444 N.W.2d
236 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (allowing a wrongful death action on behalf of fetus

whose mother was informed that a gamma globulin injection was not needed after

being exposed to hepatitis); see also Steinman, supra note 76.
100. See Paul Jacobs, Winemakers Stung by Suit Agree to Get the Lead Out,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1991, at BI (discussing a suit brought by the California

Attorney General against wine-makers compelling them to post signs warning of the
dangers of lead in wine, especially to pregnant women). The Wine-makers urged the
attorney general to intervene in an effort to prevent the growing numbers of civil
actions. One wine-maker explained, "[tihe idea of tying us up . . . with all this

frivolous litigation, led us to conclude that it is really in the best interest of industry

and consumers alike to settle." Id.; see also Elizabeth Ross, Tougher Warning Labels

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, May 14, 1991, at 7.
101. See, e.g., Amy Eppler, Battered Women and the Equal Protection Clause:
Will the Constitution Help Them When the Police Won't?, 95 YALE L.J. 788 (1986)
(discussing the denial of equal protection to women when police, who believe it is a
man's right to beat a woman, will not protect them).

on Beer Ads,
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women, is never excusable, and may continue during pregnancy."' 0 2
These injuries to fetuses rarely make front page news.10 3 But the calls

to punish the unfit, addicted mother are legion, and passionate.'0 4

There is and always has been a dismal failure by the state to

intervene in cases of domestic violence. One could assume that either

that is because a woman's safety is of little interest to the state, or
because domestic family matters are not proper preserves for the

police. 0 51 If the former explains the disregard for wife-battering,
coercive actions against pregnant drug users is even more suspect
because it demonstrates that women merit government intervention
only when they are considered the offenders, and not when they are
the victims. If the latter justifies the failure of the state to intervene
in violent home situations, what excuse for state involvement in the
behavior of pregnant women is there?
From an historical perspective, the state appeared loathe to
interfere in family affairs because women were the 'femme coverts,'
that is, the property of their husbands. Thus husbands had legal right
to do pretty much as they pleased with their chattel. Husbands were
the literal and legal heads of the family. Sir William Blackstone

commented that a woman who murdered her husband had committed
a crime analogous to treason, because she had murdered her "king."'06
Traditional Anglo-American law treated wife-battering as an "accept0 7
able practice."

102. See Ronald Chez, Woman Battering, 158 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY
1 (1988).
103. See CHARLES P. EWING, BATTERED *kOMEN WHO KILL: PSYCHOLOGICAL
SELF-DEFENSE AS LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 8-9 (1987). The author cited three studies
dealing with battered women. In the first, among 420 women, half relayed that their
mates physically beat them once a week. The second study showed that out of 350
women, 75 had been beaten with weapons. The third study revealed that out of 50
battered women, 24 were beaten while visibly pregnant. Id.
104. See, e.g., Christi Parsons, When drug-addicted babies die, is it murder?,
CHI. TRIB.,

Jan 24, 1993, § 1, at 1.

105. For an excellent discussion on domestic violence see Domestic Violence and
Custody - To Ensure Domestic Tranquility, 14 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 623 (1984).
106. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARrES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 1602
(Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1897).
107. Bruno v. Codd, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974, 975 (Sup. Ct. 1977), rev'd in part,
appeal dismissed in part, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165 (App. Div. 1978), aff'd, 393 N.E.2d 976
(N.Y. 1979); see also David B. Mitchell, Contemporary Police Practices in Domestic
Violence Cases: Arresting the Abuser: Is It Enough?, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
241 (1992).
Historically, domestic violence has been viewed as an essentially private,
family matter not suitable for aggressive governmental intervention. In fact,
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Even in the second half of the twentieth century, when wifebeating became grounds for divorce from the batterer, many courts
refused to dissolve a marriage where the battering was not sufficiently
brutal to outweigh the society's interest in preserving the holy order
of marriage. For example, in 1958 a woman whose husband was
taken to slapping her was denied a divorce:
What we have here is bickering, shortness of temper, and
vexatious conduct. Aggravation there has been, but not cruelty. The bonds of matrimony are not to be thus lightly cast
aside. There is at stake, for our society as a whole, too much
of the public welfare, too much of the public morals, in the
preservation of family ties, to permit the spouses to come and
go as tempers wax and wane . . . . [T]he cruelty we demand
... must [be in] the realm of the evil and the wicked, of
brutality, of malignancy, of indignities endangering mental or
physical health. 108
In another example, the Supreme Court of North Carolina reflected
in a case where a husband was charged with assault and
battery of his wife: "[H]owever great are the evils of ill-temper,
quarrels, and even personal conflicts inflicting only temporary pain,
they are not comparable with the evils that would result from raising
the curtain and exposing to public curiosity and criticism the nursery
and the bedchamber."1°9
It seems that where the right of a woman to save herself from
abuse is involved, the home is a sanctuary that cannot be invaded. 10
Coercive acts against pregnant women show this sanctity is not so
great when the family ties we want to sever are between a woman
and her fetus, and the nursery we wish to expose is the womb itself.
This disparate treatment of men and women under the law shows
that society does not view women as credible. From this perspective
society looks at allegations about domestic abuse skeptically. Perhaps
American law once recognized husbands as titular heads of their households
with a right to dispense corporal punishment to disobedient wives. Although
most laws of that sort disappeared during the early nineteenth century, their
residual effects continued to manifest themselves in the social norms and
assumptions of modern society.
Id. at 241.
108. Williams v. Williams, 88 N.W.2d 483, 484 (Mich. 1958).
109. State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 445, 448 (1868).

110. Frederic B. Rodgers, Develop an Accelerated Docket for Domestic Violence

Cases, 31 JUDGE'S J. 2 (1992) (reporting that every eighteen seconds a woman is
battered and that 1,500 women are killed annually by spouses or boyfriends).
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the decisionmakers should have pondered why a woman would falsely
accuse her husband, or partner, or a stranger. Do legal decisionmakers
believe that women are naturally dishonest, and lie even when they
do not have to? Apparently, it is thought that, beyond being disingenuous, women clearly have neither the right nor the ability to make
choices for themselves about their pregnancies.
Men have no established legal obligation to care for their fetuses.
Although the primary participation of the male of the species is in
providing the fodder to fertilize the egg, women must physically carry
the fetus for nine months. Coercive actions suggests that society
knows better than the mother herself. Mothers are forced to submit
to state coercion for the good of the future children for whom only
these mothers will be held responsible.
Once born, these children lose the interest and protection of a
society that wishes to intervene in their uterine development. Perhaps
if societal policing of their lives extended to their lives after birth,
and to the women who will bear them, we could justify this intervention. After the trauma of their birth, our society offers scant help to
children and virtually no protection. Our real concern for them ends
when their autonomous lives begin.
III.

STATE INTERVENTION DISCRIMINATES AGAINST POOR PEOPLE,
AND PEOPLE OF COLOR

Who suffers the most from these coercive intrusions into the
pregnancy of women? The literature and the popular press likes to
highlight the few middle-class, majoritarian mothers who get caught.
But coercive acts are directed at those who are closest emotionally,
socio-economically, and spiritually, to the bottom. Poor, Black, Hispanic, Asian and very young women are traditionally stigmatized and
observed by those in either the prosecutorial or the helping professions
as demanding attention.
About the same percentage of white women as women of color
use drugs."' White women, however, largely avoid prosecution. One
study shows that a pregnant black woman was ten times more likely
than her white sister to be reported for drug use to DCFS.1 2 The
S111.
Mark E. Barrett, Wealth, Race Play No Part in Drug Use, ROCKFORD REG.
STAR, Mar. 15, 1992, at llA; see also Ira J. Chasnoff et al., The Prevalence of
Illicit-Drug or Alcohol Use During Pregnancy and Discrepancies in Mandatory
Reporting in Pinellas County, Florida, 322 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 1202, 1204 (1990).

112. Kary Moss, Substance Abuse During Pregnancy, 13 HAv. WOMEN'S L.J.
278, 294 (1990) (citing National Ass'n for Perinatal Addiction Research and Education, Press Release (Sept. 18, 1989)).
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undisputed and shocking fact is that more than ninety percent of all
the defendants prosecuted for drug addiction during pregnancy are
women of color." 3
People of color are always identified by the majority as problematic. '4 As with women in general, some of the discrimination against
African-American women and their babies is due to the paternal
desire to offer remedial or compensatory aid. Society perceives that
only poor women of color have children out-of-wedlock, while on
drugs, and that stemming this flow of problems will make everyone
in the white majoritarian society happier. The special attention women
15
of color get is coercive, destructive and discriminatory.'
The sheer expense of drug treatment renders it beyond the reach
of most minorities. The fact that Blacks are almost twice as likely as
6
whites not to have private health insurance adds to the problem.1
These facts coupled with the death of programs for drug-addicted

mothers shows that coercive acts will fall disproportionately on the
poor."' Moreover, the choice of crack mothers as the targets of

113. Roberts, supra note 33, at 1434.
114. See Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer, The Problem of the Drug-Exposed Newborn:
A Return to Principled Intervention, 42 STAN. L. REV. 745, 753-54 (1990) (in many
areas, women of color in government-run health'care facilities are routinely tested
for drug use, while women in private care can remain untested).
115. DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW xxiii (2d ed.
1980). The treatment of Professor Derrick Bell is another example of our custom of
inequality. Professor Derrick Bell, Jr., has long identified this paternalism as a form
of "American racism initiated by whites against blacks." In the 1980s, Dean Bell
was hired to teach law at one of the nation's most prestigious law schools, Harvard.
In 1990, Professor Bell took leave from the school to protest its racially discriminatory
hiring policies. In 1992, Harvard tenured four white men; Professor Bell brought
suit, alleging discrimination in hiring against women in general and against men of
color. He took a leave of absence, which Harvard has deemed a resignation.
Harvard has been called sexist for other reasons. In 1991, law professor Mary
Jo Frug was murdered on her way home from work in Boston. She often wrote
about racism and sexism under law. In the spring of 1992, the Harvard Law Review
presented a humorous parody of Professor Frug's work. Her murder was not
mentioned. Stephanie B. Goldberg, Who's Afraid of Derrick Bell?, 78 A.B.A. J. 56
(1992).

116. See generally Cassandra Q. Butts, The Color of Money: Barriers to Access
to Private Health Care Facilities for African-Americans, 26 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 159
(1992); Geraldine Dallek, Health Care for America's Poor: Separate and Unequal,
20 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 361 (1986).
117. See Missing Links: Coordinating Federal Drug Policy for Women Infants
and Children: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Govt'l Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. 2 (July 31, 1989); see also U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES, 460, tbl. No. 745 (110th ed. 1990) (450 of African-American
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coercive acts, where crack is identified as a drug used predominantly
8
by African-Americans, bolsters that conclusion."
There is very little medical care available for poor pregnant
women." 9 It may be more significant to focus on what these children
do not get - food and doctor's care for their mothers - than to
focus on what contraband they do get. In a study of who gets
Medicaid, females account for between 59.9 percent and seventy
percent in all fifty-two jurisdictions; 64.1 percent overall. 20 Among
women of reproductive age in this country, in the early '80's, fortythree percent of those with incomes under $5000 and thirty-one percent
of those with incomes between $5,000 and $9,999 had Medicaid
coverage; only twenty percent of the women in these brackets had
health insurance.'12 Often, lack of access to abortion increases the
problems for this group of mothers, and reduces the amount of
money available for their own and their children's medical care.
"Absence of [Medicaid] abortion coverage, a significant limitation
for those with unwanted pregnancies, is very likely to affect use of
other services, including care of high-risk pregnancies and, ultimately,
care of infants with severe problems.' '1 22 Congress was not able to
mobilize enough support to overcome former President George Bush's
gag rule, preventing abortion counseling. 23 Until the government's
children live below the poverty level, as compared with 15016 of caucasian children);
Judy Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution: Finding Our Place, Asserting
Our Rights, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 9 (1989).
118. Roberts, supra note 33, at 1435.
119. See, e.g., Mike Crase, Infant Mortality Rate is Dropping in DeKalb County,
DEKALB DAILY CHRON., Mar. 26, 1992, § 1, at 1. Public health administrator Karen
Grush told reporters: "In many, many areas throughout the state, public aid women
simply cannot get in to see a physician until very late in their pregnancy, if at all."
Id. She also explained that funding for the WIC program (Woman and Infant Care,
which in DeKalb County provided supplemental food to 1200 women and their young
children) "has proven to be a major weapon in the fight to lower the infant death
rate." Id.
120. See MULLER, supra note 19, at 151 (citing U.S. DEPT. OF HHS, MEDICARE
AND MEDICAID DATA BOOK (1988) and Health Care Financing Program Statistics,

HCFA Pub. no. 03270 (1989) (tbl. 4.6)).
121. MULLER, supra note 19, at 155-56 (citing Susan Blank & Thomas Brock,
Health, Health Care and Economic Self-Sufficiency, NAT'L HEALTH POL'Y F., (Oct.
9, 1985)).
122. MULLER, supra note 19, at 158.
123. See 138 CONG. REC. S13349-50 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1992) (statement of Sen.
Cranston supporting S.323, which would overturn gag rule regulation upheld in Rust
v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991)). Shortly after his inauguration, President Bill

Clinton finally reversed this government policy. Memorandum for the Secretary of
Health and Human Services, 58 Fed. Reg. 7455 (1993) (hereinafter Presidential
Memorandum).
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position was recently reversed, even if an addicted mother wanted to
terminate her pregnancy, she could not find out how to go about it.
Although the "early initiation of prenatal care is the most costeffective means of reducing neonatal mortality for [B]lacks and for
[W]hites, and it is far more cost-effective than neonatal intensive

care .

..

.",,24

only eighty percent of white mothers and sixty-two

percent of black mothers get first-trimester care. 125 A 1984-86 study
demonstrated that for thirty percent of the Hispanic, twenty percent
of the African-American, and thirteen percent of the white women,
either there was no prenatal care until the fifth month or later, or the
26
mothers had fewer than half of the recommended visits to a doctor.'
Fetal rights advocates stop short of demanding medical care for the
fetus, and for the children after their birth. 127 Thus, minority women
suffer more coercive actions and benefit less from prenatal care than
their white counterparts.
If we accept that women in general are poorly protected against
sex and gender-specific victimization, we need also to recognize that
African-Americans are more likely victims of, arrested, prosecuted,
and more severely punished for sex crimes. Haywood Burns, the
former director of the National Conference of Black Lawyers reported: "Blacks raping [B]lacks is apparently less serious than [W]hites
raping [W]hites, and certainly less serious than [W]hites raping
[Bllacks.' '12 1 Burns reports these statistics: In Florida between 196064, five percent of the 125 whites who raped whites were sentenced
124. Theodore Joyce et al., A Cost-Effective Analysis of Strategies to Reduce

Infant Mortality, 26 MED. CARE 348 (1988), cited in MULLER, supra note 19, at 189.
125. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, NCHS MONTHLY VITAL
STATISTICS REPORT,

189.

vol. 35 no. 4, supp. 7/18/86, cited in

MULLER,

supra note 29, at

126. Tamar Lewin, Study Cites Lack of Prenatal Care, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2,

1989; § A, at 25.
127. The principle of fetal rights is being used as a basis for denying women
the right to an abortion [and the obligation to stop using addictive drugs or
alcohol] and insisting they undergo various procedures during pregnancy.
Yet, at the same time, society has not conferred on childbearing an entitlement to the resources that may be required to assure a successful outcome.
Entitlement is dependent on either status of self or spouse in an insured job
or meeting a restrictive low income standard which covers only 40074 of
reproductive age. Protection of the primacy of the labor market and wage
system in dispensing health care is given priority over universally adequate
reproductive care.
MULLER, supra note 19, at 192.

128. Haywood Burns, Can a Black Man Get a Fair Trial in this Country?, N.Y.

TIMES,

July 12, 1970, at 44, cited in

MAcNAMARA,

supra note 54, at 51.
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to death; four percent of the sixty-eight Blacks who raped- Blacks
were so sentenced; fifty-four percent of the eighty-four Blacks who
raped Whites got the death penalty; none of the Whites who raped
Blacks were sentenced to death. 29 In one famous study of rape in
Philadelphia, black women were found to be twelve times more likely
than their white sisters to be raped. 30
It is hard to imagine the same intense direction of coercive state
intervention into the lives of white woman that women of color
routinely experience. The fetal protection imposed through arrest and
coercion is motivated by paternalism and racism as much as any real
desire to help. Literally no other options are offered; no other parentchild relationship is so keenly monitored as the pregnant drug user;
and, none of this group are so disproportionately victimized by state
action than women of color.
Practically, no other result could take place, since the coercion
has its origin in personal involvement with the state and poor women
become involved with the state more easily. Poor women, most of
them nonmajoritarian, have little access to private doctors, who can
treat them and keep their secrets. They are more often victims of
crime and need to expose themselves to police. They are impoverished
and may need to undergo the scrutiny we attach to our so-called
entitlement systems. They use poor-peoples' drugs, which are illegal
and associated with street crimes, rather than the opiates of the middle
class, such as prescription drugs and alcohol which may be legal drugs
- or at least purchased more discretely. In addition, their pregnancies
are seen as costly to white society. If women are to be madonnas,
perhaps women of color need to be virgins to satisfy social notions
of propriety. Coercive actions against pregnant women, most of which
are directed against African-American mothers, address the symptoms, not the causes, of their problems. This additional aspect of
disparate treatment on the basis of race and gender cannot be tolerated.
VI.

COERCIVE ACTS VIOLATE BASIC COMMON LAW AND
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

A. COERCIVE ACTS AGAINST PREGNANT WOMEN VIOLATE
RECOGNIZED COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES OF BODILY INTEGRITY
-

There are those who believe that all law exists to protect property
even personal property, even our own bodies. Despite society's

129. Id.
130. MENACHEM AMIR, PATTERNS
NAMARA, supra note 54, at 52.

IN FORCIBLE

RAPE

(1971),

cited in

MAC-
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interest in limiting and directing their activities, even pregnant women
have a common law right of autonomy and ownership of their own
bodies. Under common law, interference with this right was illegal,
and eventually developed as a tort.
The right to bodily integrity is an ancient notion. "At the dawn
of social organization, perhaps before men and women developed
concepts of property or agreement, we speculate that primitive persons
must have taken offense at violations of their physical integrity. ' 1' 3
As early as the twelfth century there were records of actions for
trespass to the person. The plaintiffs were considered to be private
attorneys general for the king, whose civil claims helped maintain the
peace without the sheriff's intervention, and punish the transgressor.
The typical assault and battery charge, that someone caused the
complainant physical injury, was rooted in the concept of ownership
of one's physical person.' This property concept continues uninterrupted. "Physical injury to the person stands at the center of social
133
concern with tort law.
Women, like men, have an "entitlement" in their own bodies,
and they should not have nutrition, rehabilitation, or methadone
imposed upon them against their wills. However, a pregnant woman
may have her personal integrity challenged by an outsider, with the
slightest standing, who deems such coercion fit and proper. When
women become pregnant, drug users or otherwise, they become
subjected to unwanted legal interference with their personal bodily
rights.
On the other hand, a man's right of bodily integrity is treated
more sacred. For instance, if we turned the world on its head and
made men face the same harsh realities as women do, I am sure we
would receive powerful opposition. If men who were exposed to
dangerous chemicals, addicted to alcohol or cocaine, or had dangerous
propensities, were then forced to be sterilized, abstain from sex or to
use a newly developed contraceptive that only slightly increased their
chances of prostate cancer or stroke, I have no doubt the courts and
lawmakers would resist. Courts and lawmakers would find that men
131.
INQUIRY:

SPECIAL COMM. ON TORT LIAB. Sys.,

THE CONTINUING

CREATION

ABA,

TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF

OF A SYSTEM

OF SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN
AMERICAN TORT LAW 1-1 (1984).
132. See C.H.S. FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW 44-65

(1949).
133. Id. at 2-3. It serves as the basis for the modern allegation of battery brought
against doctors for unconsented touching. See, e.g., Burton v. Leftwich, 123 So. 2d
766 (La. Ct. App. 1960); ARNOLD J. ROSOFF, INFORMED CONSENT 3-4 (1981).
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own their bodies and a man's integrity would be afforded protection
based upon an "a priori ethical judgment which it is assumed that
most citizens would share."' 134 Why are pregnant women different?
Why do women enjoy less of an entitlement? Women's interests or
rights should not be lessened simply because they bear young, whose
rights have as yet to be ultimately determined by statute or judicial
decision.
Rejection of the unity of woman and fetus denies pregnant
women their common law right to autonomy. Stated simply, bodily
autonomy should guarantee a woman the right to decide what is done
to her body. The fact that a fetus lies within a woman's body should
not alter or negate that right.' 35 Justice O'Connor, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,'3 6 eloquently spoke for women as persons, with
bodies and feelings, and not nameless entities upon which the state
acts:
[T]hough the abortion decision may originate within the
zone of conscience and belief, it is more than a philosophic
exercise .... That is because the liberty of the woman is at
stake in a sense unique to the human condition and so unique
to the law. The mother who carries a child to full term is
subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that only
she must bear. That these sacrifices have from the beginning
of the human race been endured by woman with a pride that
ennobles her in the eyes of others and gives to the infant a
bond of love cannot alone be grounds for the State to insist
she make the sacrifice. Her suffering is too intimate and
personal for the State to insist, without more, upon its own
vision of the woman's role, however dominant that vision has
been in the course of our history and our culture. The destiny
of the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own
conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society. 137
Although bodily autonomy has never been formally recognized
by the Supreme Court as a fundamental right, in Cruzan v. Director,

134. SPECIAL COMM. ON TORT LIAB. Sys., supra note 131, at 4-27.
135. This is not to condone or encourage abuse of drugs that may injure a fetus.
But when rights conflict, someone has to predominate. In nearly all pre-born
litigation, the Supreme Court has recognized the superior claim of a woman.
136. 112 S. Ct. at 2807.
137. Id.
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Missouri Department of Health,138 several Justices suggested that

bodily autonomy is within that zone of fundamental interests protected
by the Constitution. Lower courts have had more opportunity to
wrestle with this issue. Perhaps countering the norm, one federal
appellate court identified the right of a mother to control her body
as inviable, despite the fact that she was pregnant. In a case denominated In re A.C. ,139
the reviewing court found that a trial judge could
not order a caesarean to be performed on a gravely ill cancer patient
in order to improve the chances of survival for her eight-month-old
fetus without attempting to determine the mother's choice. The dying
mother had "the right, under the common law and the Constitution,
to accept or refuse medical treatment."' 4 The court rejected the
argument that a "woman who has chosen to lend her body to bring
[a] child into the world has an enhanced duty to assure the welfare
of the fetus, sufficient even to require her to undergo caesarean
surgery (citation omitted)" because "[s]urely ... a fetus cannot have

rights superior to those of a person who has already been born.' 14'
Unfortunately, the majority of courts that have considered the
issue of forced caesareans in the tort context have not concluded that
a mother's bodily autonomy rights can be subjugated for the good of
her unborn child.' 4 2 This judicial coercion, like the acts against
pregnant drug users, is seriously racially imbalanced. In a study of
twenty-one cases of court-ordered obstetrical procedures, most patients were Black, Asian, or Hispanic women. In eighty-eight percent
of the cases, the court acted within a few hours, suggesting a less
than adequate balancing of the mother's rights, risks, and the alleged
3
benefits to the fetus. 4
Not only do these cases suggest an unrecognized agenda of sex
and race discrimination, but they are largely scientifically and legally
unfounded. A doctor's value judgment should not be substituted for
the woman's own wishes. "Medical knowledge is not certain enough
138. 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (involving a formerly competent adult's right to die).
139. 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990).
140. Id. at 1247.
141. Id. at 1244.
142. See Elizabeth Eggleston Drigotas, Comment, Forced Caesarean Sections,
70 N.C. L. REv. 297 (1991).
143. See Veronika Kolder, et al., Court-Ordered Obstetrical Intervention, 316
NEw EN G. J. MED. 1192, 1193 (1987); see also Lawrence Nelson and Nancy Milliken,
Compelled Medical Treatment of Pregnant: Life Liberty and Law in Conflict, 259
JAMA 1060 (1988) (arguing that the doctor's duty to promote fetal health is based
upon her ethical and care obligation to the pregnant woman; it is wrong to consider
the fetus a "second patient").
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to deny women 'the right to be wrong' while allowing physicians that
right. Women are rarely unwilling to do anything within reason for
the best interests of the fetus."' 144 The relationship between patient

and doctor is normally considered contractual in nature. Since there

can be no contract with a minor, 145 the doctor would not have a
relationship with a fetus that would necessitate him or her to breach
the duty/relationship to the pregnant mother/patient.'" The common
law should not grant a fetus rights superior to its mother when their
interests collide, but states do not act consistently when having to
choose between the unborn and the women who gave them life.
Not only are women subjected to externally-imposed decisions
about their own health, but they are likewise not afforded credibility
4
in making their own decisions. For example, in Carman v. Dippold, 1
a doctor was found not to be negligent for failing to advise a woman
in labor that her baby was in the breech position, even though the
baby died during an attempted vaginal delivery. The court found that
"it might have been imprudent" to try to obtain informed consent to
the vaginal delivery method from the mother because "she was tense
and her blood pressure had gone up.' 48 Although an isolated case,

144. MULLER, supra note 19, at 207.
145. See RozovsKY, supra note 8, at § 5.1.
146. Cf., McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (1978) (court refused to issue
injunction forcing a man to donate bone marrow to his cousin); Fordham E.
Huffman, Note, Coerced Donation of Body Tissues: Can We Live With McFall v.
Shimp?, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 409, 413-14 (1979). Huffman noted:
For a society which respects the right of one individual, to sink its teeth
into the jugular vein or neck of one of its members and suck from it
sustenance for another member, is revolting to our hard-wrought concepts
of jurisprudence. Forcible extraction of living body tissue causes revulsion
to the judicial mind. Such would raise the spectre of the swastika and the
Inquisition, reminiscent of the horror this portends.
(quoting McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d at 2-3); Department of Health &
Rehabilitative Servs. v. Straight, Inc., 497 So. 2d 692 (Fla. App. 1986) (state may
not preclude a parent from putting her child in a drug rehabilitation program even
where minors do not consent to treatment). The legislation does not restrict parents
from exerting their rights and responsibilities to educate, train and control their
children. Only where parental authority is exercised in an unreasonable manner or is
otherwise abused will the state intervene between parents and their offspring. "The
fact that the decision of the parent is not agreeable to the child or involves risks does
not automatically transfer power to make that decision from the parents to some
agency or officer of the state." Id. at 694.
147. 379 N.E.2d 1365 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).
148. Id. at 1370. Is this case consistent with the myriad of cases where the state
was unable to prove lack of consent from a victim in a rape case? Does not this
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it is the ultimate in paternalism, gratuitously passed back and forth
between the men who are posturing to protect this poor woman the doctor and the judge. It demonstrates how little autonomy women
are given from those who have authority over them. It should sound
as an alarm against the coercive actions, and other patent or subtle
kinds of sex discrimination in which male decision-makers engage,
while ostensibly acting on behalf of those poor unborn in need of
protection against their own unwise, inept, and wicked mothers.
Despite the antiquity of the protection, how women fare under tort
law is as reflective of societal notions of power and propriety as any
other challenged discrimination. 49 An American Bar Association study
described "tort law as an epicenter of jurisprudence, not simply as a
set of guides and standards for the decision of many thousands of
private lawsuits, but as a reflection of how American society feels
about justice . .. ."1o
Court-ordered caesareans, the deprivation of a woman's right to
demand information about her care, lack of access to health care,
restrictions on the right of women to make childbearing choices,
including being the subject of discriminatory coercion by the government during their pregnancies, all represent the collective legal response that women deserve and receive less than men under the law.
Health care is just one further example.
Such results arguably emanate, at least in part, from a universal
devaluation of a woman's autonomy.
Coercive actions against 'pregnant women comport with, and are
as equally discriminatory as, cases where parents have not been
allowed to refuse their own medical treatment because they have
dependent children. In a majority of these cases, it is the mother, and
not the father, whose rights are deemed secondary to the needs of
their children for a healthy parent.' 5 ' "In many of these cases, the
suggest that tension and high blood pressure obviate consent? Is it ever going to be
possible to demand some kind of consistent theory protecting or denying women's
legal rights?
149. Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass
Torts, Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.J. 848, 885-98.
150. SPECL J COMM. ON TORT LiAB. Sys., supra note 131, at 2-2.

151. See, e.g., In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331
F.2d 1000, 1008-10 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g denied, 331 F.2d 1010, cert. denied, 377 U.S.

978 (1964) (court ordered blood transfusion despite mother's religious objections
because the state had a responsibility not to allow the patient to abandon her infant

child by allowing herself to die); accord In re Melideo, 390 N.Y.S.2d 523 (1976)
(woman with serious uterine hemorrhage post-D&C was spared a blood transfusion
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patient was childless - a key consideration in view of the state's
interest in preventing the abandonment of minors in need of support. ' "1 2 Judicial intervention in a patient's personal health care
choices, directed more often at women than men, disregards common
law and constitutional rights, including privacy, autonomy, and personal religious beliefs.'
In contrast, when a man whose life experience included a financially successful career, chose to eschew medical treatment, his wishes
were acceded to. In In re Osborne, the court found that both "material
and spiritual provision" had been made for his children, and the
court was therefore relieved of protecting them against abandonment
by their father. 1S4 The Osborne court recognized the rights to bodily
integrity and autonomy only after applying criteria more likely to be
satisfied by men than by historically dependent, under or unpaid
women. This "pro-child" judicial attitude adversely and unfairly
affected women and deprived them of their rights.
State intervention in a person's medical or lifestyle choices should
be justified by a compelling reason. It is not apocalyptic and hysterical
to suggest that coercive acts against pregnant drug-users imply that
women must ultimately guarantee the well-being of the children they
are to bear. The consequences of such a position are fantastic. As
many have pointed out, there is no rational distinction between
engaging in illegal acts and legal acts, if either can seriously harm a
fetus, and if healthy children is our goal. How do we draw the line
because she had no dependents); In re Winthrop Univ. Hosp., 490 N.Y.S.2d 996,
997 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (court ordered authorization for blood transfusion where mother
of two refused on religious grounds, the court reasoned- that the state will not allow
this "most ultimate of voluntary abandonments"); cf. Wons v. Public Health, 500
So. 2d 679 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (Dissent argued the "quality" of the dependent
children's life without their parent's loving support; majority stated that the only
issue is abandonment). Contra, In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972) (allowing
refusal of medical treatment on religious grounds where both material and spiritual
provision was available for the children, so they would not be abandoned). Interestingly, I could find no cases where a man was ordered to receive medical treatment
for the good of his children.
152. RozovsKY, supra note 8, at § 7.1.2.
153. ROZOVSKY, supra note 8, at § 7.1.1 ("What is particularly interesting here
is that not only did the parents' religious interest give way to the state's interest in
the child's life, but the mother's interests in bodily integrity and freedom from
undesired intrusion were overridden by the same state interest."); Crouse Irving
Memorial Hosp. v. Paddock, 485 N.Y.S.2d 443 (1985); Cf., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (parents' right to refuse to have their children immunized
can be based both on religious beliefs and privacy).
154. 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972).
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between acting against a mother who is taking drugs, and thereby
endangering her fetus, and the pregnant woman who fails to follow
her doctor's advice during pregnancy?"' Or the mother who abuses
drugs or alcohol or speeds only once, and injures or kills her fetus in
a wreck?' 5 6 Or the mother who told my friend Rose, who teaches
physically and mentally handicapped preschool children, that she and
her husband believe in God and will keep trying to have one perfect
little girl, despite their birthing several genetically damaged children.
Or the AIDS victim who wants to conceive? The situations are endless.
And all inquiries lead to the inexorable conclusion that even if state
coercion were not patently racist, sexist, and impractical, it would
still collide with our notions of ownership, autonomy and the right
to be left alone.
B. COERCIVE ACTIONS DENY WOMEN THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS TO LIBERTY AND PRIVACY

Despite the potential conflict between the pregnant drug abuser
and her fetus, a mother must be allowed to enjoy what the Supreme
Court identified as the "right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man." '5 7 Her
potential for birthing a child must not interfere with that plethora of
constitutional protections she has already been afforded by the courts.
As the Supreme Court reiterated in Planned Parenthoodv. Casey,"'
"the Constitution places limits on a state's right to interfere with a
person's most basic decisions about family and parenthood."'5 9 She
155. See Martha Field, Controlling the Woman to Protect the Fetus, 17 L. MED:
& HEALTH CARE 114, 118 (1989).
156. See Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355 (IIl. 1988).
157. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
158. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
159. Id. at 2806. She has a fundamental right to marry whomever she chooses.
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating Virginia's anti-miscegenation
laws). She has this right to marry, even if she has not and will not support her
dependent children from a previous marriage. In Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374
(1978), the Court invalidated a Wisconsin law that forbade a noncustodial parent
from applying for a marriage license unless he submitted proof of his compliance
with a court order for child support. The party before the Court happened to be a
man, who had failed to support his children, had lived with his ex-wife, and had
impregnated his current girlfriend, whom he wanted to marry. It could be argued
that the Court's invalidation of the Wisconsin law, which had as its salutary goal the
protection and support of children with living and competent parents, was drawn
from the Court's, and society's stereotypes about proper behavior under the circum-
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has privacy and autonomy rights. Roe v. Wade' 60 is still good law,
and so a mother has greater rights than a nonviable fetus. In Thornburgh v. National College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the
Court reiterated:
Our cases have long recognized that the Constitution
embodies a promise that a certain private sphere of individual
liberty will be kept largely beyond the reach of government
(citations omitted). That promise extends to women as well as
to men. Few decisions are more personal and intimate, more
properly private, or more basic to individual dignity and
autonomy, than a woman's decision - with the guidance of
her physician and within the limits specified by Roe - whether
to end her pregnancy. A woman's right to make that choice

freely is fundamental.161

The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that basic right in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 62 when it approved of some, but invalidated
other state laws restricting the right of any woman seeking an abortion
before fetal viability. Some argue that the right to abort a fetus does
not necessarily give a woman the right to abuse it. However, a fetus
cannot be protected through coercive actions against its pregnant
mother because it subordinates or destroys her autonomy. The alterstances. Mr. Zablocki wanted to be a man - make an honest woman out of his
pregnant girlfriend and legitimate the hapless fetus growing in her belly. Without
that marriage, or some legal process, the child would be a legal bastard. She has the
right to make personal decisions about planning a family, even if she is unmarried.
In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court rejected a state law that
forbade the use of contraceptives by married persons. It is this case that is most
often cited as establishing the fundamental right to privacy in family matters that
requires the Supreme Court to examine any laws interfering with that right with strict
scrutiny. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S 438 (1972), the Court invalidated a statute
that denied unmarried persons access to birth control. There was no fundamental
rights analysis, simply a rejection of the classification/distinction between married
and unmarried as irrational. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the Court
invalidated a Nebraska law that prohibited teaching school in any language but
English. The Court found that parents have the right to make educational decisions
for their children, ostensibly even if being non-English-speaking would be a handicap
to the children thus educated. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925),
the Court extended this parental right to make child-raising choices to invalidate state
prohibitions of private, religious schools. She can make choices for her children
which may not be the same made by the Court, but to which it will defer.
160. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
161. 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986).
162. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
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natives to carrying a fetus to term are likely not available'to most
pregnant addicts. The population against which virtually all reported
coercive actions have been taken to date cannot obtain free abortions.161 In addition, these women are likely not to have health
insurance, and may be further restricted in their free choice to abort
because of state laws restricting the access of minors to information
about choices. 64 Also, studies show that many places, regardless of
the legality or the pro-choice philosophies of gynecologists, have no
65
doctors to perform abortions.1
Beyond privacy and liberty interests associated with a woman's
right to make family choices, she may also have a constitutional right
in her personal, bodily autonomy. Support for a constitutional right
to bodily autonomy can be seen in the reasoning of Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health.'66 The Court majority
"assume[s] that the United States Constitution would grant a com-

163. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 510 (1989) ("[Ilt
is difficult to see how any procreational choice is burdened by the State's ban on the
use of its facilities or employees for performing abortion."); Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297, 317 (1980) ("[lit simply does not follow that a woman's freedom of choice
carries with it a constitutional entitlement to financial resources to avail herself of
the full range of protected choices . . . [The] Hyde Amendment leaves an indigent
woman with at least the same range of choice. . . ."); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,
474 (1977) (upholding a state statute which withheld Medicaid benefits for nontherapeutic abortions, explaining that "[t]he indigency that may make it difficult - and
in some cases, perhaps impossible - for some women to have abortions is neither
created nor in any way affected by the Connecticut regulation."); see also Hyde
Amendment, Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 926 (1979).
164. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S.Ct. 1759 (1991) (upholding § 1008 of the Public
Health Service Act which, in part, prohibited those receiving federal family planning
funds from counselling, advocating or providing referrals for abortions). In Rust,
the Court stated that "lilt would undoubtedly be easier for a woman seeking an
abortion if she could receive information . . .but the constitution does not require
that the Government . . . provide that information." Id. at 1777. See also Ohio v.
Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 508 (1990) (upholding an Ohio statute
which prohibited performing abortions on unmarried, unemancipated minors without
notifying one of her parents or receiving a court order, while "leav[ing] the question
open" as to whether the judicial bypass procedure in the statute was necessary);
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (Court upheld parental
notification, 24-hour writing period, and content of medical advice about fetal
experience; invalidated spousal notification). But see Presidential Memorandum,
supra note 123 (suggesting reversal of the restrictions on access to abortion).
165. See Gina Kolata, Under Pressureand Stigma, More Doctors Shun Abortion,
N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 8, 1990, at 11; Christi Parsons, When Drug-Addicted Babies Die,
Is It Murder?, CHI. TRIr., Jan. 24, 1993, § 1, at 1.
166. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).

1993:263]

ADDICTED PREGNANCY AS A SEX CRIME

petent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving
hydration and nutrition."'' 67 In a concurrence, Justice O'Connor
recognized a constitutional right to bodily integrity. She concluded
that the:
liberty interest in refusing medical treatment flows from decisions involving the state's invasions into the body. Because
our notions of liberty are inextricably entwined with our idea
of physical freedom and self-determination, the Court has
often deemed state incursions into the body repugnant to the
68
interests protected by the Due Process Clause.
Dissenting Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun clearly recognized the fundamenial, constitutional right of bodily integrity. "The
right to be free from medical attention without consent, to determine
what shall be done with one's own body, is deeply rooted in this
Nation's traditions .... ,,169 The practical effect of state coercive
acts against pregnant women, in whatever form they take, is that
women whose bodies contain fetuses cannot choose to do with their
bodies what they wish. Their liberty interests are infringed upon
because the state has determined that the rights of the unborn
predominate over their own.
Lets us assume for a moment that pregnant women do have a
fundamental right - or a bundle of fundamental rights - associated
with their own bodies and their own pregnancies. If that is so, then
the Court ought to look at any legislation or state coercive action
against these women with the strictest scrutiny, assuming that there is
1 70
a category of Supreme Court review calling for such scrutiny.
"New" fundamental rights, that is, those beyond protection from
invidious race discrimination specifically envisioned by the framers of
the Bill of Rights, are what Professor Gerald Gunther describes as
"particularly dynamic, open-ended, and amorphous.' " 7
167.
168.
169.
170.
neatness.

Id. at 279.
Id. at 287.
Id. at 305.
Of course, constitutional law and decision does not lend itself to such
Before his retirement, Justice Marshall often attacked the misnomer of the

Court's "two-tiered approach." The Court apparently seeks to establish . . . [that]

equal protection cases fall into one of two neat categories which dictate the appropriate standard of review - strict scrutiny or mere rationality. But this Court's ...
decisions defy such easy categorization. A principled reading of what this Court has
done reveals that it has applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination
allegedly violative of the Equal Protection Clause." San Antonio Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
171. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 603 (12th ed. 1991).
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Arguably, then, pregnant addicts may have one of these "new"
fundamental rights with which state action interferes. Consequently,
the Court ought to demand that the means adopted be narrowly
tailored, necessary, and justified by compelling state interests. State
coercive acts against pregnant women fail to satisfy these constitutional minima on all counts. They are hardly narrowly tailored, for
the practical effects of such coercion limit her autonomy, mandate
medical and legal attention, and deprive a woman of the right to be
left alone. Furthermore, these actions cannot be justified because they
do not result in any practical benefit to the fetus. They have never
been shown to decrease the number of women who give birth to drug
affected or addicted children. These coercive acts are and have been
taken against women whose children have not yet shown and may not
ever demonstrate the deleterious effects of their mothers' drug use.
No other methods of control have been tried, or even suggested, such
as adequate prenatal care and counseling. The states have yet to prove
that their interests in pre-viable fetuses are so compelling that the
rights of their mothers must be subordinated, while they serve as
guarantors of fetal health.
C. WOMEN, ESPECIALLY WOMEN OF COLOR, ARE DENIED EQUAL
PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW.

The earliest amendments to the United States Constitution attempted to guarantee to every citizen equal protection under the law.
When rights conflict, as they do between a fetus and its mother, the
weighing of the relative merits of each claim is necessary to determine
whose rights are more important. Women who are pregnant, particularly poor women of color, have been singled out for punitive
treatment because of their'pregnancy. Such classification mandates
an examination of the fairness of such treatment. It appears to
unequivocally deny the members of this group equal protection. The
Court has struggled with the application of equal protection to gender.
Its decisions are inconsistent and often reflect what the Court thinks
society expects of or for, women. Current Supreme Court jurisprudence may not be sufficient to guarantee the consistency and fairness
needed to protect women from being sanctioned for the sins of their
bodies.
It makes sense that pregnant drug users can claim that extra
protection from arbitrary and unfair treatment from the government
because of their womanhood. 7 1 Sex-based classifications, according
172. Being pregnant apparently means very little to the Supreme Court, because
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to the Supreme Court, deserve "intermediate scrutiny." Sexual classifications are not automatically suspect, but they deserve special
attention from the Court because of their higher likelihood of being
unfair and discriminatory.
This is relatively new jurisprudence. Historically, the Court approved of legislative enactments that treated women less favorably
because women were biologically different. For example, in Bradwell
v. Illinois, a late nineteenth century Court affirmed a state's refusal
to allow a woman to practice law, because "civil law, as well as
nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman," and apparently,
women were fortunate to enjoy the "paramount destiny and mission"
of fulfilling "the noble and benign offices of wife and mother." '7 3
The Court clung to the ideal roles of femininity as justifying less than
equal, but purposely separate laws for nearly a century. In 1962, the
Court approved a state law that exempted women from jury duty
unless, she "as the center of home and family life . . . determines
that such service is consistent with her own special responsibilities. 1 17 4
Over the last twenty years, the Court announced in a series of
cases that it would look differently at sex-based classifications, but
how different the evaluation would be was not always apparent. In
1970, in Reed v. Reed,' the Supreme Court struck down an Idaho
statute which provided that when several people sought the position
of administrator of an intestate estate, males must be preferred over
females. The Court found the classification completely unrelated to
the state objective of efficient probate proceedings.
In Frontiero v. Richardson, 76 the Court examined the gender
classification differently, notwithstanding the fact, or perhaps because
of the fact, that the white male plaintiff was not a member of any
it has never eschewed its position in Geldulig ,. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) that
women expecting children deserve any special constitutional treatment. The Court
upheld the California law that excluded from its of disability insurance coverage any
disability accompanying normal pregnancy and childbirth, because the law did not
discriminate against women, especially pregnant women, but distinguished between
"pregnant and non-pregnant person." Id. at 497. I much prefer being non-pregnant
to pregnant, for all kinds of emotional, health and comfort reasons, but for the only
situations in which it will actually make a legal difference ...

in the workplace ....

Congress has remedied the Court's error by enacting the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4750-52.
173. 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872).
174. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961).
175. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
176. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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class subjected to historic discrimination. The Court refused to endorse the United States Navy regulation, which provided that military
women could not receive dependent benefits for their husbands without actual proof that their husbands were economically dependent on
them. There was no corollary requirement of proof for servicemen
whose wives claimed dependent benefits. Justice Brennan opined that
classifications based on sex are inherently suspect.'7 7

This level of scrutiny, normally reserved for race and alienage
cases, did not survive after Frontiero. However, the Court continued
to apply some heightened standards for evaluating a state statute that
distinguished between the sexes. In Craig v. Boren, 78 the Court
concluded that an Oklahoma statute, which prohibited the sale of
3.2% beer to males under 21 and females under 18, violated the Equal
Protection Clause because the statute's gender-based classification did
not "serve important governmental objectives" nor was it "substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.' ' 7 9
The results of challenges to classifications based on gender as
violative of the equal protection rule have been inconsistent. Sometimes women receive paternalistic and preferential treatment, 180 and
sometimes they are denied access to the opportunities they need to
earn a living and compete with men as market equals. 8' A skeptic
could observe that some of the inconsistency in the Supreme Court's
decisions regarding gender and equal protection depends on who
stands to benefit, and who brought the case. Professor Mary Becker
argues that when men are the beneficiaries, when they are dependents
of their wives, when they are denied access to jobs, when more
responsibility rests upon them than they care to assume, the Court
looks carefully, to determine why the balance of historical power has
been so badly disturbed. 8 2 Professor Judy Scales-Trent maintains
that:
[t]he way in which a group is defined for purposes of the
Equal Protection Clause both describes how that group is
defined by the larger society, and defines how that group
177. 411 U.S. at 688.
178. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
179. Id. at 197.

180. Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979) (preferential gender-based classification for allocating federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children).
181. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).

182. Mary Becker, Obscuring the Struggle: Sex Discrimination, Social Security,
and Stone, Seidman, Sunstein & Tushnet's Constitutional Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv.
264 (1989).
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should be viewed. The Court must see how the group has been

treated historically by the larger society before it decides what
level of protection it will provide the group.'83
After Craig v. Boren and its progeny, it was thought that "what
the Court did was strike down sex-based classifications that were
premised on the old breadwinner-homemaker, master-dependent di-

chotomy inherent in the separate spheres ideology."' 184 However, it is
clear that the Court - and our society, has never given up on

justifying different treatment because of that separate spheres notion.
Instead of concentrating on equal access and avoiding unnecessary

and non-critical incursions into female empowerment, the Court
continues to make decisions on the basis of its earliest ruminations
about what it, as guardian of our social fabric, considers sex-appropriate roles.' 85 This conclusion is supported by several cases decided
after the Court declared its preference for heightened scrutiny.
The Court has upheld distinctions based upon gender without
demanding any clear proof of the need for them. In Rostker v.
Goldberg,8 6 decided in 1981, the Court approved of the male-only
draft registration requirement. The Court accepted the position of
Congress that women should not serve in combat, without really
asking why Congress reached that decision. According to the Senate
Armed Services Committee Report, "[t]he principle that women should

not intentionally and routinely engage in combat is fundamental, and
enjoys wide support among our people.'

8's7

Apparently, the Supreme

183. Judy Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution, 24 HARv. C.R.C.L. L. REv. 9, 20 (1989).

184. Wendy W. Williams, Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7
RTS. L. REP. 175, 178 (1982).
185. Cf. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (invalidating a law that
allowed only mothers, and not fathers, a veto over adoption of illegitimate children);
Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (allowing an illegitimate child to sue for
wrongful death of its mother, but not of its father, if the father had not acknowledged
the child during its lifetime). It seems the Court relied on its own view of what is
best for illegitimate children, rather than on a consistent view of the proper degree
of scrutiny for gender classifications. See generally JOHN E. NOWAK AND RONALD E.
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 14.14-19 (4th ed. 1991).
186. 453 U.S. 57 (1981). One author says of Rostker and Michael M. v. Superior
Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981), that "perhaps the outcome of these two cases - in
which sex-based statutes were upheld - were foregone conclusions and that the only
question, before they were decided, was how the court would rationalize the outcome." Williams, supra note 183, at 182.
187. S. REP. No. 826, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2646, 2647.
WOMEN'S
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Court is among the number of "our people" who support that
principle. However, it harkens back to the separate spheres philosophy, ostensibly eschewed by the new equal protection jurisprudence.
Professor Wendy Williams suggests that the decision affirms the social
concept of "men's culture: aggressor in war."' 8
Arguably, Michael M. v. Superior Court,8 9 decided the same
year, also reflects the view of the Supreme Court that there are sexappropriate roles, which are as much a justification for disparate
treatment on the basis of gender than satisfaction of the standards
evolved for intermediate scrutiny. In Michael M., the Court upheld a
California law that concluded only men, and not women, were capable
of committing the crime of statutory rape. The Court accepted the
state's important interest in preventing teen-aged pregnancies. This
goal, just as the one which motivates coercion against pregnant women
who use drugs, is honorable. Nonetheless, it is difficult to comprehend
how permitting women to have sex, voluntarily or forcibly, with
under-age males, but illegalizing the same acts when the sex roles are
reversed, avoids illegitimate births or unwanted abortions. The impracticality and unfairness of the state's position was apparently
overlooked in favor of maintaining society's stereotypes about men
and women. Such cases seem to adopt the view that women are
inherently nonaggressive, and in need of protection, at least those
women who satisfy the societal notions of proper feminine behavior.
Such stereotypes likewise animate state coercive acts directed at pregnant women, especially those women least deserving of the privilege
of pregnancy: poor women of color.
It may be hopeless to argue that these coercive actions violate
the Constitution's promise of equal protection under the law. Hopeless, because even if the Supreme Court attempts to consistently apply
the rules of law developed since the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which it never has been able or willing to do, there are
reasons why women are different. A gender claim is distinct from a
race claim, or one based on national origin, simply because biology
and society have made women's lives, and the demands thereon, so
different. Arguably, at least from the perspective of someone who
has never been blessed or burdened with this biology, there is room
for legal differential treatment. Professor Sylvia Law observed: "There
is no reason to believe that Black and White people are inherently
different in any way that should ever be allowed to matter in the law.
188. Williams, supra note 183, at 179.
189. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
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Men and women, by contrast, are different in significant sex-specific

physical ways."'90
Women do not need a law professor to tell them that their bodies
are different, or, most wondrously, capable of bearing children.
However, these physical differences have bestowed upon the state a
right to distinguish women from men, 19' and to exert some control

over women's bodies. Women can claim to be a discrete and insular

group, with immutable characteristics, which has suffered historical

discrimination. 9 2 However, the Court can, and has, decided that the
state can rationally and lawfully treat women who are pregnant,

fertile,

94 delicate, 95

deterred from having sex by the fear of becoming

pregnant,196 busy with homemaking,

discrimination,

98

93

97

victimized by years of past

or too nurturing and non-aggressive to be con-

190. Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV.

955, 965 (1984).
191. See, e.g., Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
192. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
193. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). Gilbert was a Title VII
case in which the Court upheld the employer's exclusion of maternity benefits as not
gender-based discrimination, but rather a simple distinction between pregnant and
non-pregnant persons. Congress amended Title VII to specifically reverse the holding
in Gilbert, by making discrimination on account of pregnancy includable in sex
discrimination under § 701(k) of the statute. Gilbert was predicated, in part, upon a
still existent Supreme Court decision, Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S 484 (1974), which
accepted California's exclusion of pregnancy disabilities from its state disability
insurance program as lawful despite equal protection claims.
194. In Autoworkers v. Johnson Controls, Ill S. Ct. 1196 (1991), had the
employer done its homework and proved that the airborne lead was more dangerous
to fertile. women than to fertile men, its actions might have been upheld. That case
arose under Title VII, but a public employer, e.g., some utilities, could theoretically
try to exclude fertile women for their own and their potential children's protection.
195. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
196. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding the conviction of a seventeen-year-old man who had consensual sex with a sixteen-year-old
woman under a California statute that provided only men, and not women, could be
convicted of statutory rape).
197. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961).
The [wioman is still regarded as the center of home and family life. We
cannot say it is constitutionally impermissible for a State . .. to conclude

Id.

that a woman should be relieved from the civil duty of jury service unless
she herself determines that such service is consistent with her own special
responsibilities.

198. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (Florida may allow widows and not
widowers to take a property tax exemption). Professor Wendy Williams argues that
this case is unlike the compensation and remediation cases decided under Title VII,
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scripted into military combat service,'9 differently than men. Classification by sex, in other words, has often satisfied the Court as
permissible.
The coercive actions discussed in this paper classify not only by
gender, but likewise by race. 200 The Supreme Court has concluded

the civil rights of a single racial
that "legal restrictions which curtail
20
group are immediately suspect."

'

The group against whom most coercive actions are directed
represents the intersection of race and gender, for which there is no
specific heightened protection. 20 2 African-American men are not subject to this type of classification and discriminatory treatment. They
are not the wombs; they are the progenitors. As a class, men of color
fare no better and sometimes worse than their sisters of color.
However, in this case, biology protects them. It would be unfortunate,
and contrary to any notion of fairness, if the fact that the coercive
actions are sexist as well as racist may insulate them from the type of
constitutional scrutiny that would lead to their invalidation.
There is no jurisprudence that would allow African-American
women special constitutional protection. That is shameful and ridiculous because historic discrimination, proved in a myriad of ways, 20
is directed toward African-American women, who are at the bottom

where the Court has approved affirmative action or set-asides. Rather than attempting
to engage in a "finely tailored fact-based process for identifying and remedying past
discrimination," as the Court has done in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980)
and Johnson v. Santa Clara Dept. of Transp., 480 U.S. 616 (1987), Kahn and other
cases affording women preferential treatment were decided on the bases of "old
stereotypes about women's role and status." Williams, supra note 183, at 179-180
n.35.
199. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
200.
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BROUGHT AGAINST WOMEN OF COLOR (October 3, 1990), cited in George Bundy Smith
and Gloria Dabiri, PrenatalDrug Exposure: The ConstitutionalImplications of Three
Government Approaches, 2 CONST. L.J. 53 (1991). The authors also criticize coercive
acts because they violate constitutional protections afforded criminals, including
notice, mens rea, and cruel and unusual punishment.
201. Korematsu v. United States, 322 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
.202. Judy Scales-Trent argues either that black women are a subset of Blacks,
and therefore any laws affecting them as a class should be regarded with the strictest
scrutiny, or that as victims of the "dual oppression" endemic to women and Blacks,
they should be regraded as an even smaller and more discreet group, for whom the
Court should advance scrutiny even greater than the old strict scrutiny, by lessening
plaintiffs' burden of proving intent. Scales-Trent, supra note 182, at 9.
203. Clark, supra note 82, at 487 n.137.
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of every socio-economic scale. Coercive acts are undeniably genderspecific, and I argue, sexually discriminatory. Women of color, as a
subset of the objects of government oppression, are overwhelmingly
victimized. As Judy Scales-Trent argues so convincingly, "since black
women carry the burden of membership in the black group, which is
already entitled to strict scrutiny protection, and in the disfavored
female group, they should be entitled to more than strict scrutiny
protection. ' ' 204 Black women are both stigmatized and subordinated
in every actual measure. If the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection means anything, it must include protection against disparate and discriminatory coercion and punishment for crimes or omissions that any class could and does perpetrate. However, there is
nothing in Supreme Court precedent that would afford these women
the protection they deserve, both by reference to the presumed historical purpose of the constitutional promise and by the actual fact
20 5
of their status.
Although there is case law that suggests that government must
intend to discriminate against a class, 206 the Court has long been wary
of application of facially neutral laws that fall more heavily upon a
protected class. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, in Yick
Wo v. Hopkins,20 7 the Supreme Court invalidated a local ordinance
that banned the operation of hand laundries in wooden buildings. Its
practical significance was that virtually all Asian hand-laundry operators were prevented from plying their trade. The Court found
intentional discrimination against Asians based on the fact that exemptions from the ordinance were routinely granted to non-Asians.
Therefore, the Court inferred that disparate impact could be unlawful.
There have been other cases where the effects, rather than the
intent or purpose of a law, formed a basis for finding a constitutional
204. Scales-Trent, supra note 182, at 23.
205. African-American women have fared just as poorly under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, since any proved discrimination against black females can be rebutted
by proof that the employer does not discriminate against white women, and is,
therefore, operating free of prohibited gender bias, and proof that African-American
men suffer no discrimination, thereby establishing a lack of discrimination on the
basis of race.
206. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (even though a disproportionate
number of African-Americans fail to pass a written test for employment at the police
department, and the test had not been validated to establish its reliability for
measuring subsequent job performance, statistical proof alone did not prove that the
Department purposefully discriminated against African-Americans).
207. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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violation. 20 8 These cases suggest that, at the very least, a dramatically
disparate impact can and should shift the burden to the state to
justify its seemingly neutral, pro-child policy which has the effect of
threatening the rights of women, especially women of color. 20 9 In a
recent case, the Court issued its strongest suggestion that disparate
impact could lead to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. In
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,210 the

Court held that although the state had assigned a social worker to
work with a father who was suspected of child abuse, the Due Process
Clause did not require the government to protect a child from its
abusive father.
The importance of DeShaney in determining the legitimacy of
current government coercion of pregnant drug users is the Court's
statement that the promises of equal protection would be meaningless
if the government were to "selectively deny its protective services to
certain disfavored minorities." ' 21 If denial of services on the basis of
race offends the Constitution, so ought the imposition of sanctions
on the same basis. Ironically, the factual determination in DeShaney
seems to reject the position that the government must act to protect
children, at whatever cost, contrary to the presumed motivation for
government actions against pregnant women.
We cannot always expect the Supreme Court to raise the consciousness of a nation full of God-fearing people with a right to their
judgments. The Court "reflect[s], by and large, mainstream views
...and only very occasionally . . . moves temporarily out ahead of
public opinion. 2 12 We live in an era of strict constructionism where no justice would be willing to bear the mantle of his or her
208. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Hillary, 474 U.S. 254 (1986) (statistical evidence of
systematic exclusion of racial minorities from a grand jury may shift the burden to
the state to disprove its discriminatory intent); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982).
In this case, African-Americans were a majority of the electorate, but a change to
at-large elections resulted in the election of an all-white board of commissioners. This
led to Court invalidation of the election procedures, even though the Court articulated
a demand for proof of intentional and purposeful discrimination and the proof

consisted of facts showing that elected officials had been insensitive to the AfricanAmerican community and wanted to dilute their political strength. Id.

209. Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Unconstitutional

Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. REv. 95 (Where the impact is clearly discriminatory,
the author encourages an active judicial role in discovering any source of proof for
discriminatory intent).
210. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
211. Id. at 197 n.3.
212. Williams, supra note 183.
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substantive due process forebears," 3 who, early in the century, were
said by their critics to be excessively pro-active, who made personal
choices about what was good for society. 3 4 We look more and more
to the "Founding Fathers" to make sure we are not giving people
more rights than the framers of the Constitution meant them to have.
As Justice Thurgood Marshall reminded us, the Constitution was
never intended by its framers to protect African-Americans or
women. 215 Nonetheless, these groups certainly ought to get some
measure of protection through contemporary Supreme Court review,
however imperfect that protection is.
It is hardly original to conjecture that major changes are needed.
"Achieving sex-based equality requires social movement for transformation of the family, child-rearing arrangements, the economy, the
wage labor market, and human consciousness. ' 21 6 There are laws that
promise equal treatment, but they are limited in scope to public
education, employment, and housing. 2 7 These laws do not afford
213. GUNTHER, supra note 171, at 445. "Rejection of the Lochner heritage is a
common starting point for modern Justices: Reaction against the excessive intervention of the 'Old Men' of the pre-1937 Court strongly influenced the judicial
philosophies of their successors." Id. Clearly, the last two nominees to the Supreme
Court, Justices Souter and Thomas, were reticent about having an opinion about
anything vaguely controversial, much less touting a political and social agenda.
214. See BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW

(1976).

215. Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States
Constitution, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1, 2 (1987).
For a sense of the evolving nature of the Constitution we need look no
further than the first three words of the document's preamble: "We the
People." When the Founding Fathers used this phrase in 1787, they did not
have in mind the majority of America's citizens. "We the People" included,
in the words of the framers, "the whole Number of free Persons. On a
matter so basic as the right to vote, for example, Negro slaves were excluded,
although they were counted for representational purposes - at three-fifths
each. Women did not gain the right to vote for over a hundred and thirty
years.
Id.
216. Law, supra note 189, at 956.
217. That is not to suggest that litigation under those civil rights statutes have
perfected women's rights, or have been free of the cultural biases that keep women
in their place. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (women lawfully
excluded from working as guards at a maximum security prison where rapists were
not segregated from the rest of the inmates). "A woman's relative ability to maintain
order in a male, maximum security unclassified' penitentiary of the type Alabama
now runs would be directly reduced by her womanhood." Id. at 335. I am reminded
of the comments of a former beauty pageant winner, and a law student of mine,

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 13

protection to addicted mothers against state interference, coercion,
and sanction. Therefore, the route of constitutional challenge must
be pursued." 8

about her experience as a counselor in a maximum security prison in Virginia. She
said she felt less worried about rape in a prison full of guards than in the law school
parking lot. She was struck by how Dothard denied women the opportunity to work.
In her town, she said, women had three employment options: a fast food restaurant,
the prison, or prostitution. And, of course, only the prison offered dependent health
care benefits.
218. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 470 U.S. 432, 441, 448 (1985); see, e.g.,
School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 (1987) ("Section 504 [may] achieve its goal
of protecting handicapped individuals from deprivations based on prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded fear. . . ."). Congress, however, has stated clearly, in response
to the Court's nonsensical refusal to find discrimination without reason in the
pregnancy cases that treating pregnant women different from any other worker
without a legitimate business justification is per se discrimination. See Civil Rights
Act of 1964 - Pregnancy Discrimination, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4749, 4750-52. Congress found this provision of Title VII to be a necessity, because
the Supreme Court refused to disallow such distinctions. The Supreme Court in
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), had held that discrimination based
on pregnancy was not per se sex discrimination, and in Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty,
434 U.S. 136 (1977), the Court held only that policies based on gender may violate
Title VII; see also Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (use of statistics
to prove a disparate impact upon African-Americans in employment); Hazelwood
Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977) (when using statistics to show
discrimination in a school district the comparison should be the number of black
teachers in the district with the number of black teachers in the labor market, not

with the number of black students in the district); W.

BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT

81 (1965), cited in Scales-Trent, supra note 182, at 23. In Washington v.
U.S. 229 (1976), the Supreme Court rejected a claim that a municipal
426
Davis,
requirement of a certain level of reading proficiency to be eligible for employment
with the police department denied black citizens equal protection. Although the test
score disqualified a disproportionate number of African-American applicants, the
Court accepted the city's rationale for the requirement, and said that without proof
of discriminatory intent, the law was constitutional. Later, the Court refined its
meaning in Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985). In that case, a provision of
the Alabama Constitution which disenfranchised persons convicted of crimes of moral
turpitude, was declared unconstitutional. The Court did so for two reasons: a
statistically significant disparate impact upon black voters, and proof of historic
intent to discriminate against them. Interestingly enough, Alabama's miserable efforts
to save their constitutional provision by arguing that the historic intent was to
disenfranchise both poor Whites and Blacks, i.e, class rather than race discrimination,
failed to disabuse the Court of its conclusion that the intent to discriminate against
Blacks was "beyond peradventure." Id. at 232. In evaluating a state's compliance
with the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has instructed the generations that what
motivates it to designate a level of protection is whether society's views of the group
reflect "prejudice and antipathy" or "an outmoded notion" of the group's capabilCHILDREN
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Even if pregnant drug users have no fundamental rights with
which state coercion interferes, the direction of that coercion against
a specific class, such as women, requires that any laws affecting them
must be evaluated against a standard that demands that all persons
be guaranteed equal protection under the law.
Any distinct group whose membership is limited by accident of
birth and whose political power is patently weak, ought not be
classified for purposes of government benefit or burden unless the
government has an overriding or compelling interest in some goal that
can only be reached by group classification. When the government
draws lines by race or national origin, the Court is automatically
suspicious, and such criteria call for the greatest attention from the
Supreme Court. Coercive action against pregnant drug-users classifies
persons because of their immutable characteristics. The practical effect
of coercive actions against pregnant drug abusers is that women of
color, implicating both race and national origin, are overwhelmingly
the objects of state action. 2 9 Any government classification for differential treatment as a result of that class similarly mandates strict
scrutiny for means and end.
Simply on the basis of race, these women should be guaranteed
strict scrutiny of any local or state law that restricts them in any way,
not only in the exercise of any of their fundamental rights: privacy,
family decision-making, and autonomy. 220 The Court has concluded
that "legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial
group are immediately suspect." 22' They will be sustained only if the
ities, rights and proper preserve. This is precisely the standard courts use in determining compliance with various Civil Rights statutes. The philosophical underpinnings,
as well as its ostensible purpose, equal treatment, make civil rights laws a worthwhile
area of inquiry. Although an argument for equal protection against discriminatory
state action is not the same as equal treatment under Title VII, it is analogous. Since
pregnant women are the obvious targets, even a gender neutral rule, coercing either
fetal parent, would have a provable disparate impact upon women.
Under statutory analysis, discrimination is proved simply by looking at the
practical effect. It makes sense to use the same rules in equal protection analysis.
Here is an example. In a study of welfare programs, one scholar found a
proposed law in Georgia that would have made it a misdemeanor to bear an
illegitimate child. Since the rule would have become applicable in 1952, before it
became less taboo for professional and/or lesbian women to bear and raise children
without benefit of matrimony, and since 70% of all mothers of illegitimate children
were black, the disparate impact of the law would have been sufficiently obvious,
one would hope, to obviate the need to show intentional discrimination.
219. PALTROW, supra note 199, at 53.
220. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
221. Id. at 216.
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interests of the state are compelling, as when a fetus becomes viable,
and the state's interest in the preservation and protection of potential
life outweighs the pregnant mother's privacy and family interest in
terminating her pregnancy. 222 Coercive actions are either directed
against mothers whose fetuses are not viable, or directed against
mothers whose fetuses have already been damaged by their mother's
drug use, which would obviate any compelling reason for the state to
act.
I may conjecture that historically, men have been treated well,
and it is this status quo the Court seeks to maintain, rather than
attributing to the Court the welcome goal of equalizing power, access,
and ending subordination. The Supreme Court continues to deny the
role gender plays in our social structure. Sex and race can and ought
to be analogized for purposes of guaranteeing equal protection under
- and from - the law. Twenty years before the passage of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, a legislative effort to prohibit discrimination on
the basis of race and sex, sociologist Gunnar Myrdal wrote of the
universality of discrimination against non-majority persons of color
and women:
The similarities in women's and Negroes' problems are not
accidental. They were, as we have pointed out, originally
determined in a paternalistic order of society. The problems
remain, even though paternalism is gradually declining as an
ideal and is losing its economic basis. In the final analysis,
women are still hindered in, their competition by the function
of their procreation; Negroes are laboring under the yoke of
the doctrine of unassimilablity which has remained although
slavery is abolished. The second barrier is actually much
stronger than the first in America today. But the first is more
eternally inexorable. 223

Physiological differences between the sexes provide an intuitively
appealing argument for their different, and disparate treatment. Thato
is not to say, however, that this is fair. The Court has struggled with
the application of equal protection to gender. Its decisions are inconsistent, and often reflects what the Court thinks society expects of,
or for women. There is the danger of futility in making the argument
that coercive actions against pregnant women deny those women equal
222. Webster v. Reproductive Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
223. GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 1078 (20th Anniversary ed.
1962).

1993:263]

ADDICTED PREGNANCY AS A SEX CRIME

protection. Current Supreme Court jurisprudence may not be sufficient to guarantee the consistency and fairness needed to protect
women from being sanctioned for the sins of their bodies.
Our society strives toward the goals and guarantees of the Founding Fathers in many ways. Statutes, case law, and constitutional
interpretation by the Supreme Court are reticulated parts of a whole
evolution toward fairness. For that reason, the purpose of civil rights
legislation should inform judicial constitutional interpretation, since
the goals are the same. Only women, and virtually only women of
color, suffer sanction for being both pregnant and addicted. How
much more proof that such actions are unfair do we need?
D. COERCIVE ACTS INTERFERE WITH BASIC SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS

Even if the category - pregnant, poor, African-American, Hispanic, Asian, or pregnant regardless of racial membership - merits
no special level of scrutiny by a court, at a minimum, all state action
must be rational to satisfy constitutional requirements. Long before
the Court adopted its concept of semi-suspect classes, it demanded a
rational means to a lawful end. In this undertaking, commentators
urged the Court to engage in pragmatic analysis.
Twenty years ago, Gerald Gunther asked the Court to "assess
the means in terms of legislative purposes that have actual bases in
reality . . . [and to] gauge the reasonableness of questionable means
on the basis of materials that are offered to the Court ....
A

policy and program of coercive action against pregnant women that
contravenes the legitimate end of healthy births, cannot satisfy that
standard. Even were one to concede that the distinction - pregnant
women are different and subject to stricter control for the good of
their fetuses - is rational, the method of control is not. Coercive
acts are impracticable because they do not achieve the goals of
protecting the fetus from the ravages of drugs or alcohol, help the
mothers who carry these fetuses, or avoid the proliferation of drug
addiction.
Coercive acts serve no social purpose. Although the government's
ends, articulated or inferred, are legitimate and even noble, the means
are irremediably flawed. Everyone agrees that infants born of addicted
mothers are victims in need of help, but penalizing addicts is neither
224. Gerald Gunther, A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L.

REV. 1, 21 (1972).
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the least restrictive nor most effective method. 225 Most of the judges
who have heard these cases end up rejecting the states' theories
justifying intervention. Prosecutors in the earliest coercive acts against
women relied upon child abuse and neglect laws. Often "child" was
not defined as including a fetus, and consequently judges rejected the
226

theory.

227 Most
Some legislative changes have been made or proposed.
legislators who have considered the problem generally agree that it
may be worth trying to exercise jurisdiction over these women if it
can help them and their babies. On the other hand, it may not. There
is no evidence that it will. Furthermore, states must justify this glaring
intrusion into women's private lives, even if these women do not
suffer the loss of any fundamental rights, and their gender serves as
an appropriate basis for singling them out. Making the state prove
that its acts are not only rational, but have some basig in fact, has
been called the new substantive due process. Put most simply, each
of us can legitimately demand that the laws our government enacts
satisfy a basic test of rationality. In this context, that means the right
to satisfy the old end-means test, without a court sitting as a super228
legislature to determine the social efficacy of the law. No one has

225. See generally Roy G. Spece, Jr., The Most Effective or Least Restrictive

Alternative as the Only Intermediate and Only Means-Focused Review in the Due
Process and Equal Protection, 33 VILL. L. REV. 111 (1988).
226. For a discussion of this approach, see Kary Moss, Substance Abuse During
Pregnancy, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S LAW. J. 287 (1990).
227. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 29 (West 1991); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para.
802-3(c) (1988) ("Neglect" includes a finding of: "any newborn infant whose blood
or urine contains amounts of a controlled substance."); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556
(West 1992) ("Neglect includes prenatal exposure to a controlled substance . . .");
S.C. House Bill No. 3858 (1992); W. Va. Senate Bill No. 21, 70th Leg. - 2d. Reg.
Sess. (1992);.
228. Even after the demise of the now abandoned substantive due process review
by the Court, which has been described as a time when the "justices upheld laws
which they personally agreed would be necessary to protect important social goals
even though the legislation involved some restraint on commerce," JOHN E. NOWAK
ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.4, at 352 (1986), the Court still engaged in
practical, "does it work?" analysis. In United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304
U.S. 144 (1938), a Due Process challenge of a federal statute which prohibited
interstate shipment of milk with non-milk fat added was rejected. The Court stated
that, "legislation . . . should not be pronounced unconstitutional unless in light of

the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude
the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis." Id. at 152. The Court
concluded that the inquiry "must be restricted to the issue whether any state of facts
either known or which could reasonably be assumed, affords support" for the law.
Id. at 154. Such fact-based inquiry is not uncommon, and is appropriate in most
cases.
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ever proved the positive effects of coercive actions against pregnant
drug-abusers. The best that can and has been offered is that something
has to be done. That should not satisfy this test of rationality.
This due process concept is extracted from the dormant commerce
clause, which gives the states power to regulate those areas left alone
by Congress. When the Supreme Court considers the propriety and
constitutionality of state actions affecting interstate commerce, it must
also decide whether the state laws illegally discriminate against "persons" who are guaranteed equal protection by the Fourteenth Amendment. 229 States have extremely broad power to regulate for safety,
even when their actions affect the free flow of goods in commerce both a constitutional and federal statutory goal230 - because of the
Court's historic deference to state police power. 23' However, even in
this capacity, the states are subject to a fairly strict test of reasona-

bleness .232

Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona 233 is a good example of this
principle. When the state of Arizona tried to limit the length of trains
in order to make intrastate transportation safer, the Court balked.
Almost every train passing from East to West had to pass through
Arizona. The Court asked "whether in the circumstances the total
effect of the law as a safety measure in reducing accidents and
casualties is so slight or problematical as to not outweigh the national
interest in keeping interstate commerce free from interferences ....,"234 The test is not so much a balancing test, as an inquiry
into whether the restriction that denies equal protection, that treats
some persons differently because of their citizenship or burdens
interstate commerce, or leads to the practical but undesirable result
of inviting retaliatory legislation of one state against her sisters, makes
sense. The Court found that. it did not, and invalidated the law.
The Court ought to reach the same conclusion in evaluating
coercive actions against pregnant women. 235 These steps, taken against
229. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, reh'g denied, 471
U.S. 1120 (1985) (invalidating a state law imposing higher taxes on nonresident
corporations because there was no rational justification for treating them differently).
230. See, e.g., the Preamble to the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §
151 (1988).
231. The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352 (1913).
232. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). The Court actually
engaged in factual analysis of the state rules and their effect on safety.
233. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
234. Id. at 775-76.

235. State courts have long engaged in practical fact-finding to justify or

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 13

a discreet group, women, many of whom are part of an even more
discreet and arguably protected group, women of color, have a myriad
of practical and undesirable effects with few or no positive results.
The fetuses are not protected from early harm, and the mothers have
no available rehabilitative services. Women who have been monitored
have intentionally eschewed medical care during the remainder of
their pregnancies. Consequently, the children born to the subjects of
the coercion are left uncared for, and the pitiful pregnant abusers
have lost their privacy, autonomy, and right to do their best with
their own children.
Nothing practical has emerged from state coercive actions -both
because they are not empirically justified and because nothing is done
for any of the victims beyond coercion. Much injury occurs prior to
the time a woman knows she is pregnant. 236 In cases like UA W v.
Johnson Controls,237 the employer argued that it had to disqualify all
fecund females for precisely that reason. 23 Consequently, coercive
actions against visibly pregnant mothers, or worse yet - mothers
who have already given birth - are useless in preventing the harm to
the fetus. 239 Of course, there' are few options for children born of
these mothers, except perhaps that they may be taken away from
their drug-abusing mothers. Being drug-free for a period of institutionalization after state intervention does not do much toward raising
a child in a drug-free environment. There are few places where these

invalidate state laws that rested upon gender classifications. See, e.g., Pennsylvania
v. Daniel, 243 A.2d 400 (Pa. 1968) (refusing to find that all gender classifications
offend the Equal Protection Clause, but invalidating a law that allowed men to be
eligible for parole earlier than women for the commission of the same crime, unless
the facts of each case justified it); Mollere v. Southeastern Louisiana College, 304 F.
Supp. 826 (E.D. La. 1969) (invalidating a law that required women under age 21,
attending state college, to live in dorms, where no such rule applied to men, even
though the state said its own finances demanded the arrangement, since facts could
not prove the reasonableness of the gender distinction). See generally BARBARA ALLEN
BABCOCK ET AL., SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW, 120-23 (1975).

236. D. Bellinger et al., Longitudinal Analyses of Prenataland Post-NatalLead
Exposure and Early Cognitive Development, 316 NEW ENG J. MED. 1037-43 (1987).

237.
238.
Cynamid
F.2d 986
239.

111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
See, e.g., Oil, Chem., and Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. American
Co., 741 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., 692
(5th Cir. 1982).
Congressional Testimony of Dan Griffith, Ph.D. (May 6, 1991), in JUDICIAL

RESPONSE TO ALCOHOL AND DRUG PROBLEMS AMONG CHILDREN AND FAMILIES: A
REGIONAL TRAINING PROJECT, § 3, at 2 (Nat'l Council of Juvenile and Family Court

Judges, eds., 1992) [hereinafter Judicial Response].
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crack babies can be cared for, 240 and even fewer places where their
mothers can go, either during or after their pregnancies. 241 The actual
numbers of treatment centers especially for pregnant women, or those
242
that welcome the children of those seeking help, are abysmally small.
In cases where states sought to coerce or sanction mothers for their
drug use, there are no facts to show the state offered any help to a
mother whose life was - and maybe still is - so out of control that
she became drug or alcohol dependant.
Let us assume that most addicted mothers understand their
dilemma; they realize they must have help. There is already proof
that help is difficult if not impossible to find. There is a clear bias in
health care generally. Researchers report that medical policy-makers
either do not consider women, by failing to research their health
needs, or undervalue them. In allocating resources, women are considered to be worth less than men based on the measurement of

240. See Jean Davidson, Pregnant Drug Addicts: Babies Jam Agencies, L.A.

TIMES, Apr. 25, 1989, pt. II, at 1, col. 1; James Denison, The Efficacy & Constitu-

tionality of CriminalPunishmentfor Maternal Substance Abuse, 64 S. CAL. L. REV.
1103, 1111-12 (1991).
241. Drug and alcohol programs for women are far fewer than for men.
A review by the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism notes
limitations of past research done on women and alcohol. There has been
less research on the effects of alcohol on adult women than on fetuses, and
studies of the effects of alcohol on human sexuality have focussed on the
male ability to perform sexually. In treatment programs, practical services
that would have enabled women with family responsibilities to enter treatment were omitted from planning, and traditional sex role values were
reported to influence attitudes of personnel in treatment agencies.

NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON ALCOHOL ABUSE AND ALCOHOLISM, SEX-RELATED ALCOHOL

(June 1985).
242. See Laurie Rub~nstein, ProsecutingMaternal Substance Abusers: An Unjustified and Ineffective Policy, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 130, 146 (1991), citing Born
Hooked: Confronting the Impact of Prenatal Substance Abuse: Hearing Before
House Select Committee on Children, Youth and Families, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
112 (Apr. 27, 1989) (noting that 87% of New York City treatment programs refused
to treat pregnant crack addicts on Medicaid, and even fewer welcome the children of
those seeking help); Michele Morris, Cries in the Dark Often Go Unanswered: For
Drug-Addicted Mothers, Treatment is Hard to Find, Even Harder to Stick With,
WASH. POST, July 2, 1991, at Al ("Less than 20% of drug treatment programs in
Washington even admit pregnant women . . . less than 5% help, or allow mothers
to keep their children with them during treatment."); cf. LUCIA ZEDNER, WOMEN,
CRIME, AND CUSTODY 6 (1991). The Eugenics Movement was unsuccessful and
abandoned a program of relocating alcoholic women to rural areas to prevent their
neglect of their born and unborn children because of "serious questions about the
usefulness of any penal and reformatory endeavor."
EFFECTS, ALCOHOL RESOURCES UPDATE
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socioeconomic costs of illnesses, including lost "man-hours" on-thejob, that emphasize and value men's activities - wage earning and a
243
lifetime of participation in work for wages outside the home.
Women often receive less, or later care than men for the same
illness. 2" Women's illnesses, like bulimia and PMS, 245 have been often
discounted or ignored.
Very little is known about drug addiction and mental illness
among women. Men define what is sanity, and what kinds of dependency, for example, like that of a man upon a woman to maintain a
home and raise children so he can devote his life to his career, are
normal. 46 Women are often undertreated for depression, for which
they are the most common sufferers, and most often over-tranquillized. 247 Women of color in this country tend to get little mental
248
health care.
In addition to all of the other reasons why coercive actions are
wrong, one may argue that sanctions based upon a woman's addiction
violate other constitutional guarantees. Medical organizations consistently hold that substance abuse is a disease. 249 The objects of state
intervention are addicts, and prosecutors' arguments that they need
some incentive to quit drugs are naive and wrong. 2 0 The American
Medical Association acknowledges that women do not take drugs to
243. See supra note 28, at 33.
244. An example, would be catheterization for patients with heart disease.
Jonathon N. Tobin et al., Sex Bias in Considering Coronary Bypass Surgery, 107
ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 19 (1987), cited in CHARLOTTE FELDERMAN MULLER,
HEALTH CARE AND GENDER 37 (1990).
245. See GAIL SHEEHY, THE SILENT PASSAGE (1992).

246. Marci Kaplan, A Woman's View of DSM-III Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders, 38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 786 (1983), cited in MULLER,
HEALTH CARE AND GENDER

44 (1990).

247. Martin J. Bass and Linda Pederson, Is there a Trend A way from Tran-

quillizing Women?,

77 CAN. J. OF PUB. HEALTH

CARE AND GENDER 45

(1990).

119 (1986), cited in MULLER,

HEALTH

248. See, e.g., SHEEHY, supra note 244 (African-American women in menopause); Barbara Omolade, The Unbroken Circle: A Historical and Contemporary
Study of Black Single Mothers and their Families, 3 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 239 (1987)
(cultural bias in, inter alia, health care for women of color).

249. Judicial Response, supra note 234, at § 1.
250. See Paul A. Logli, Substance Abuse During Pregnancy: Legal and Social
Response: The Prosecutor's Role in Solving the Problem of PrenatalDrug Use and
Substance Abused Children, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 559, 566 (1992) ("Some critics of the

prosecutor's role argue that coercing a woman into drug treatment by any means is
bad public policy ....

If such women are not forced into treatment after birth of

their first drug addicted child, other damaged children are likely to follow.").
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harm the fetus, but to satisfy an acute psychological and physical
need for the drug. 251 Twice, the United States Supreme Court has
252
found that drug addiction is an illness. In Robinson v. California,
the defendant was arrested and convicted under a California statute
for being addicted to the use of narcotics. The Supreme Court found
that "[t]o be addicted to the use of narcotics is said to be a status or
condition and not an act. ' 25 3 The Court held that a statute which
convicted one based on the status of being addicted to the use of
narcotics was "cruel and unusual punishment" under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 25 4 The Court analogized this statute to one punishing a
person for being "mentally ill, or a leper, or to be afflicted with a
venereal disease. ' 255 In Powell v. Texas, 25 6 the Court upheld a Texas
statute which made public drunkenness illegal, holding that the statute
did not amount to "cruel and unusual punishment" under the Eighth
Amendment. 257 In doing so, however, the Court noted that "there is

widespread agreement today that 'alcoholism' isa 'disease'.... ''258

Either coercive acts punish women for drug addiction, rather than an
actual crime, or they punish women for their status - pregnancy rather than their drug addiction. Neither course is rational.
Not only are the coercive actions impractical, but they do not
satisfy any goals society may have regarding the role or purpose of
sanction and punishment. Assuming that the actual results of any
type of coercive actions are the same - separation of mother and
child - all coercive actions can be viewed as sanctions. But most of
the theories for punishment: deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation, 25 9 fail to justify the actions the states have taken against these
women. Retribution, the theory of justly deserved punishment, is the

251. See Joan Beck, In Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, Guess Who Has No Rights,
Nov. 27, 1989, at 11. ("[The AMA's recommendation is that] [sleeking
a court order to compel a pregnant woman to accept treatment intended to help her
unborn infants is inappropriate . . . ."). The AMA House of Delegates favors
rehabilitative services instead of prosecuticdn, and noted "glaring" lack of such
services.
252. 370 U.S. 660 (1961).
253. Id. at 662.
254. Id.at 667.
255. Id. at 666.
256. 392 U.S. 514 (1967).
257. Id. at 531-37.
258. Id. at 522. Nevertheless, the Court distinguished the Texas statute from the
California statute in Robinson, explaining that Powell was not convicted for being
an alcoholic, but for being drunk in public. Id. at 532-34.
259. HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968).
CHI. TRIB.,
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likeliest rationale. However, it is improper in this case. It is arguable
that pregnant drug users are held most culpable only in the view of a
male-dominated society that disapproves of their failure to act like
proper women.
The famous and distinguished Victorian judge, Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, argued that "the punishment of criminals was simply
a desirable expression of the hatred and fear aroused in the community
by criminal acts. ' 26 0 He finds that criminal law stands in the same
relation to the passion for revenge as marriage does to the sexual
passion. 26' Interestingly, the coercive acts against pregnant drugabusers may involve both society's desire to punish illegality and its
disapproval of a woman's failure to control her sexual appetite. Legal
punishment controls and directs an otherwise rampant and base
instinct, just as marriage keeps our animal urges under control. The
poor, pregnant coke addict has not conformed to our societal need,
unchanged since the age of Victoria, despite the sexual revolution, to
check those dark sexual urges, which in the case of the addict, end in
a pregnancy that risks the safety of some misbegotten infant.
Retribution makes sense when the wrongdoer understands the
immorality or impropriety of her act. That may not be possible for
an addicted mother, and it is also possible that the normative value
of a drug-free pregnancy is not universal. Even if there were consensus
that drug use is bad, there surely is less than complete acceptance of
the notion that losing custody of one's baby - or incarceration - is
the right form of censure which validates the use of retributive goals
for sanction. "In this view, the emphasis is shifted from our demands
upon the criminal and becomes a question of demands that the
criminal does or should make upon himself to reconcile himself to
the social order. 2 62 The pregnant addict must understand that the
majority of powerbrokers and lawmakers in this country, who have
never known or experienced the demands pregnancy places upon the
mother, expect a pregnant woman to make whatever sacrifices necessary to provide health and safety to her fetus. It is believed that an
addict who volitionally (we assume, despite the denotation of 'addiction') continues to abuse drugs for her own gratification, with apparent disregard and neglect of her fetus, deserves to be punished.
However, even acknowledging that a reasonable cross-section of

260. Id. at 37.
261. See JAMES STEPHENS, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL
(London, 1883), cited in PACKER, supra note 258, at 11.
262. PACKER, supra note 258, at 38.

LAW

IN ENGLAND

II 80

ADDICTED PREGNANCY AS A SEX CRIME

1993:263]

society deems the acts of these women immoral, 263 the discriminatory
application of such punishment, its interference with fundamental
rights, and its simple impracticality, removes any possible justification
for its use.
Another justification for punishment is that its imposition will
deter future bad behavior. This justification is based upon the theories
of the philosopher Jeremy Bentham, who, much like the law and
economics analysts, "assumes a perfectly hedonistic, perfectly rational
' 2
actor whose object 'is to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. 6
Ideally, punishment provides an impetus for utilitarian deterrence. In
general, it is difficult to quantify what effect, if any, punishment has
on deterring people from engaging in criminal acts.
Critics argue that the punishment of a specific wrongdoer after
the fact, has no value in deterring the person specifically punished
from doing the same thing again. 265 However, we can never guess
what general deterrent effect punishment may have, since no one
knows how many women successfully avoided pregnancy while on
drugs, aborted their fetuses, or broke their habits before pregnancy.
Psychological critics reject the special deterrence notion because of
their belief that criminals are not rational, but driven. Similarly, in
the case of a drug-addicted woman, it is even more likely that
addiction may negate the rational functioning of her mind. Thus, a
presumption of rational behavior is contradicted by what we know
about physical and psychological dependency.
On the other hand, if we presume a useful and workable Benthamite model applied to the pregnant addict, we may end up with a
result opposite from the social goals relating to protection of the
baby, reducing drug use, and so on. If the pregnant drug user is
capable of rational decision-making, she will avoid contact and prenatal care if she knows that she will be the subject of state coercive
actions if she seeks care or legal help during her pregnancy. She may
even attempt to deliver her own child, rather than be arrested or have
her baby taken by social workers when she delivers in a hospital.
These results are counter to the goals of the society as a whole,
263. We must ask ourselves the same question that Lord Patrick Devlin asked
thirty-three years ago in his Maccabean Lecture in Jurisprudence at the British
Academy: "What is the connection between crime and sin and to what extent, if at
all, should the criminal law of England concern itself with the enforcement of morals
and punish sin or immorality as such?" PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF
MoRALs
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264.
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despite any value of deterrence under the Benthamite model. In
addition, as with other crimes, the case studies of recidivist drugaddicted mothers are numerous.
The deterrence rationale simply does not function well in the case
of addicted pregnancy. First, we must assume that an addicted mother
has already been immune to the deterrent effect of illegalizing certain
dangerous drugs because she continues to use them. Second, she often
gets her cocaine money though illegal acts, such as prostitution or
larceny. Third, the punishment of imprisonment already results in the
removal of her children before and after birth. Is it any more likely
that illegalizing, as a separate offense, the use of drugs while pregnant
will deter her from using those drugs to which she is addicted or
committing the crimes necessarily related to her addiction?
The last espoused theory for punishment is rehabilitation. At first
blush, this appears to be the most humane reason for punishment.
We must remember that "[h]owever benevolent the purpose of r6form,
however better off we expect its object to be, there is no blinking the
fact that what we do to the offender in the name of reform is being
done to him by compulsion for our sake, not for his." ' 26 We punish
pregnant drug addicts to avoid the economic and social consequences
of her addicted pregnancy - the possibly injured baby. We have a
societal prerogative to do that, and it would seem an efficient solution.
However, the documented failure of our society to have real rehabilitation programs for drug users, especially those with children, makes
this justification for coercive actions more ephemeral than real. Simply
incarcerating the addict may break her habit, and removing the child
born of that addicted pregnancy will protect it from its mother's bad
influence. On the other hand, the dearth of resources to deal humanely
with these coke babies reduces the possibility of actually improving
society and protecting the victim of this alleged crime. Dare we punish
women for their gender, their race, their addiction, and their poverty,
when we have no way to rehabilitate them? Professor Herbert Packer
rightfully designates punishment in the name of rehabilitation "gra-

tuitous cruelty.'

'267

Finally, sanctions directed at pregnant women may also have the
negative effect of seeming to minimalize their wrongdoing because
the loss of their children is so out of proportion to the harm they
26
have done. 1
266. PACKER, supra note 258, at 53-54.
267. PACKER, supra note 258, at 56.
268. There is another bad effect of disproportionate punishments so far as they
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CONCLUSION

No one claims that a woman who endangers her fetus, even
though she may have no real affirmative choice because of her
addiction, is a hero. Any examination of her straits, however, should
evoke pity, rather than the loathing accompanying such crimes as
murder. We must do more than throw up our hands and say that no
one can change all of society. We are lawyers, committed to some
sense of social order under a set of rules. However, we should not
spin our wheels and waste our time pursuing means that are unfair,
discriminatory, ineffective and arguably illegal, in the guise of doing
something.
The women whose particular plight I describe in this paper are
relatively few in number. In terms of absolute quantity of harm, these
government actions rank fairly low. The study of such an issue would
not merit so much attention, if it were an isolated example of an
organized, law-abiding, individual rights oriented society gone briefly
awry.
Unfortunately coercive actions against pregnant addicts represent
more than mere benign failures to control a serious social problem.
Such government coercion ignores the still developing jurisprudence
of the unborn. It rejects the predominance of the mother's interests,
which was first recognized in Roe v. Wade, and, except for occasional
blips, remains unchanged. It excuses fathers, and by doing so, accepts
the antiquated notions of patriarchy which deny both genders and
their children an opportunity for fair treatment and access. It reflects
a negative and patronizing view of these women who become addicted
and pregnant, and seems to punish them because they are women
who have sinned. Coercive acts are just another in a series of
substitutes for the decent health care that women are generally denied.
Finally, state coercion of pregnant women denies these women equal
protection and substantive due process under the law. These state
actions are neither justified nor practical, and intentionally, or by

involve excessive severity. It is this: if a man is very severely punished for a
comparatively slight offence, people will be liable to forget about his crime and think
only of his sufferings, so that he appears a victim of cruel laws, and the whole
process, instead of reaffirming the law and intensifying men's consciousness that the
kind of act punished is wrong, will have the opposite effect of casting discredit on
the law and making the action of the lawbreaker appear excusable and almost heroic.
A.C. Ewing, A Study of Punishment II: Punishment as Viewed by the Philosopher,
21 CANADIAN B. REV. 102, 115-16 (1943), cited in SANFORD KADISH AND STEPHEN
SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES

330 (5th ed. 1989).
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egregious historic accident, classify and discriminate on the bases of
gender and race.
Sadly, coercive actions against unhappy, unhealthy, addicted and
impoverished pregnant women are part of the larger whole of discrimination on the basis of gender, and, in this case, especially on the
basis of the color of the mother's skin. It is incredible to observe that
people would risk infringing upon a woman's constitutional rights;
dispense sanctions so disproportionately upon women, especially minority women; refuse to make fathers care or provide for their
children, while penalizing women who fail to guarantee fetal health;
and take ineffective, if not counterproductive steps to halt the proliferation of drug dependency, rather than make it possible to have
healthy babies. The sex crimes in the lives of these women are done
to them, not by them. Deterring their behavior makes us feel as
though we are addressing the problem of drugs. It also makes sure,
in one more small but integral way, that power does not change.

